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The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),1 by 
enacting the Securities Exchange Act ("Exchange Act") section 21D(b),2 
resolves conflicts among the circuit courts regarding appropriate pleading 
requirements in securities-fraud actions under section IO(b) of the 
Exchange Act.3 Section 21D(b)(l) provides that in any private action 
under the Exchange Act based on allegedly false or misleading 
statements, "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have 
been misleading, [and} the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading."4 Section 21D(b)(2) further provides that the complaint 
must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind."5 Together, these 
provisions resolve conflicts among the circuits by adopting the Ninth 
Circuit's requirements for pleading falsity and the Second Circuit's 
requirements for pleading scienter in securities-fraud cases. 
Section 2 lD(b )( 1) effectively codifies Ninth Circuit law interpreting 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s provision requiring circumstances 
constituting fraud to be alleged with particularity.6 The Ninth Circuit's 
en bane opinion in In re GlenFed Securities Litigation7 held that Rule 
9(b) requires plaintiffs alleging fraud to explain how and why allegedly 
I. Pub. L. No. l04-67, l09 Stat. 737 (l 995). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1995). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."). 
7. 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
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fraudulent statements were false or misleading: "The plaintiff must set 
forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false. 
In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why the 
statement or omission complained of was false or misleading."8 
Section 21D(b)(l) similarly requires plaintiffs to "specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons 
why the statement is misleading."9 GlenFed and section 21D(b)(l) 
differ somewhat from the prior law in other circuits, which did not 
always require plaintiffs to specify the content of statements or to allege 
evidentiary facts showing how and why they were misleading. 10 
Section 21D(b)(l) thus strengthens the pleading standard for alleging 
false or misleading statements by adopting the Ninth Circuit standard for 
pleading falsity. 11 
Section 21D(b)(2), on the other hand, adopts the Second Circuit's 
standard for pleading scienter. Since the late 1970s, Second Circuit 
decisions have required plaintiffs alleging fraud to raise "a strong 
inference" of scienter, 12 which can be done by alleging "motive and 
opportunity" or by alleging "facts constituting circumstantial evidence 
of either reckless or conscious behavior."13 Other courts---including the 
Ninth Circuit in G/enFed-rejected the Second Circuit's "strong 
inference" standard, holding that under Rule 9(b) plaintiffs cannot be 
required to plead facts to support conclusory allegations of fraudulent 
intent or recklessness. 14 Section 21D(b)(2) resolves a conflict among 
the circuits, for Exchange Act cases at least, by requiring plaintiffs to 
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind."15 
8. G/enFed, 42 F.3d at 1548; see also Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (Supp. 1996). 
I 0. See infra notes 55, 60 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra note 8 I and accompanying text. 
13. In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993), see infra 
notes 81-83, and accompanying text. 
14. See i,ifra notes 52-54, and accompanying text. In G/enFed, for example, the 
Ninth Circuit flatly rejected Second Circuit Jaw, GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545-47, holding 
"that plaintiffs may aver scienter generally, just as the rule states---that is, simply by 
saying that scienter existed." Id. at 1547. 
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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Section 21D(b)(2) scrupulously avoids any implication that it alters the 
standard for what actually constitutes scienter under the Exchange Act, 
allowing plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind."16 Congress knew that "the required 
state of mind" for a section 1 0(b) violation was knowledge of falsity or 
recklessness. 17 With another section of the PSLRA, it raised the 
required state of mind to "actual knowledge of falsity" for certain 
"forward-looking" statements. 18 With a new Exchange Act section 
21D(g), Congress imposed limitations on joint-and-several liability for 
reckless conduct, warning that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be 
construed to create, affect, or in any manner modify, the standard for 
liability associated with any action arising under the securities laws."19 
Thus, under section 21D(b)(2), "the required state of mind" is actual 
knowledge for section 1 0(b) violations based entirely on specified 
forward-looking statements, and knowledge or recklessness for all other 
types of statements or representations. 
On its face, then, section 21D(b) imposes a uniform national pleading 
standard that is stronger than that which had existed in either the Second 
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. It adopts GlenFed's approach to pleading 
falsity with particularity, but opts for the Second Circuit's "strong 
inference" standard for pleading state of mind, without altering "the 
required state of mind" for a section 1 0(b) violation. 
Nonetheless, in the first cases filed under the PSLRA, defense counsel 
invoked the PSLRA's legislative history to argue that section 21D(b) 
does something very different from what its text says. They argued that, 
far from adopting the Second Circuit's "strong inference" test for 
pleading scienter, Congress really intended with section 21D(b)(2) to 
impose a new and untested standard for pleading scienter that is more 
demanding than Second Circuit case law and that cannot be satisfied 
with allegations of motive and opportunity, or with allegations of 
reckless misconduct.20 Some have gone so far as to argue that section 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
17. See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text. 
18. With a new Exchange Act section 21E, Congress provided that for certain 
narrowly-defined "forward-looking statements," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (i) (1995), made 
by specified persons under certain conditions, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a)(b)(l), the required 
state of mind shall be "actual knowledge" that a statement is false or misleading. 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B)(1995). 
19. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(g) (1995). 
20. See Reply Mem. in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, 
Marksman Partners L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No. 96-
0872-WJR(JRx)); Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for Permission to Appeal 
Certified Interlocutory Order, at 13-16, Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceu-
tical Corp., 9th Cir. No. 96-80170 (June 3, 1996); Motion to Dismiss Complaint and 
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21D(b) implicitly abolishes liability for reckless misconduct in private 
actions under the Exchange Act, even for non-forward-looking 
statements. 21 
The first reported decisions under the PSLRA sensibly rejected such 
contentions. Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical 
Corp. 22 did so explicitly with a scholarly opinion flatly rejecting 
contentions that section 21D(b) overrides the Second Circuit "strong 
inference" standard or abolished liability for recklessness.23 Zeid v. 
Kimberly24 ignored defendants' arguments that the Second Circuit case 
law had been superseded and evaluated the complaint under Second 
Circuit precedents allowing plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference" with 
allegations of "facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either 
reckless or conscious behavior" or "facts 'establishing a motive to 
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so. "'25 Yet a third decision, In 
Supporting Memo at 14-15 (March 18, 1996), and Reply Mem. in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, at 16 n.7 (May I, 1996), Zeid v. Kimberly, N.D. Cal. No. C-96-20136 
SW(PVT); see also Stephen F. Black, et. al., The Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995: A Preliminary Analysis, 24 SEC. REG. L. J. 117, 134-37 (1996); Walter Reiman, 
et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A User's Guide, 24 SEC. REG. L. 
J. 143, 163-66 (1996). 
21. Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for Permission to Appeal Certified 
Interlocutory Order, at I 6-19, Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 9th 
Cir. No. 96-80170 (June 3, 1996). 
22. 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996),petition to appeal denied, No. 96-80170 
(9th Cir. June 28, 1996) (order denying petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b)). 
23. Id. at 1308-12; see generally Alan Schulman, Eric Isaacson & Jennifer Wells, 
Pleading Standards Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: The 
Central District of California 's Chantal Decision, CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS, 
Summer 1996, at 14, 15-18; Michael A. Perino, A Strong Inference of Fraud? An Early 
Interpretation of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, I SEC. REFORM ACT 
LmG. REP. 397, 397-401 (1996); Patrick J. Coughlin & Eric A. Isaacson, Commencing 
Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA "), in 
SECURJTIES LITIGATION 1996 9, 4-19 (Jay B. Kasner & Bruce G. Vanyo, eds. 1996). 
24. 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
25. Id. at 437-38 (quoting Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269). Although the district 
court correctly used Second Circuit standards to evaluate the complaint in Zeid, we 
believe it erred in holding that the complaint did not meet the standard of the Second 
Circuit precedents. In another case, this one filed before the PSLRA took effect, a 
district court cites the PSLRA as "codifying the Second Circuit standard for pleading 
scienter" that the court proceeds to apply. Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd v. Sapiens 
International Corp., No. 95 Civ. 9165 (RPP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12104, at *23 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1996). 
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re Silicon Graphics Securities Litigation,26 has departed from Marks-
man Partners and Zei<J21 to hold that section 21D(b) both abolishes 
liability for recklessness and demands substantially more than the Second 
Circuit's "strong inference" standard.28 
In her Silicon Graphics opinion, Judge Fem M. Smith relies on 
President Clinton's interpretation of a cryptic sentence and an endnote 
in the Statement of the Managers accompanying the Conference Report 
on the PSLRA.29 The Statement of the Managers stated that "[b]ecause 
the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading 
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law 
interpreting this pleading standard."30 "For this reason," an endnote 
added, "the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading 
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or reckless-
ness. "31 Although President Clinton endorsed the legislation '.I' text for 
adopting the Second Circuit's "strong inference" pleading standard, he 
nonetheless vetoed the bill, arguing that "the conferees make crystal 
clear in the Statement of the Managers their intent to raise the standard 
even beyond that level. "32 
"Further emphasizing its 'crystal clear intent' to heighten the pleading 
standard," wrote Judge Smith in Silicon Graphics, "Congress overrode 
the veto."33 "Thus, in order to state a private securities claim," she 
concluded, "plaintiff must now allege . . . how the statements are false 
26. No. C 96-0393 FMS (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1996) (order dismissing complaint 
with leave to amend certain allegations). 
27. Id. at 13 n.4 ("The Court respectfully disagrees with the opinions in Zeid v. 
Kimberly and Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., which interpret 
The [PSLRA] as adopting the Second Circuit standard.") (citations omitted). 
28. Id. at I 0-16. Although the decision in Silicon Graphics was rendered after this 
article was accepted for publication, we have tried to take account of it with last-minute 
revisions. With these revisions we have also added citations to two articles published 
by academic commentators after this article was accepted for publication. See John C. 
Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat 
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 977-85 (1996); Michael A. Perrino, A 
Strong Inference of Fraud? An Early Interpretation of the 1995 Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, I SEC. REFORM ACT LJTIG. REP. 397, 402-05 (1996). 
29. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec Litig., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 11-13 
(N.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 1996). 
30. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 740. 
31. Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747 n.23. 
32. President's Message to House of Representatives Returning Without Approval 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210 
(Dec. 19, 1995). 
33. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12. 
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or misleading, and create a strong inference of knowing misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the defendants."34 
The Silicon Graphics interpretation of section 21D(b) is untenable. 
Where the text of a statute is clear, courts should not resort to legislative 
history-much less to the views of opponents of the legislation--in order 
to contradict it. 35 The text of section 21D(b) is clear, and nothing in 
it suggests that when Congress adopted the Second Circuit's "strong 
inference" formulation, it really meant to impose an even stronger 
standard for allegations of scienter. Nor does anything in it suggest that 
Congress intended to overrule the case law that framed, defined, and 
interpreted the very words Congress chose to adopt. Further, nothing in 
section 21 D(b) suggests that "the required state of mind" for a section 
lO(b) always requires knowing, rather than reckless, conduct. 
Nonetheless, Silicon Graphics adopts an erroneous interpretation of 
section 21D(b)'s legislative history, relying on the views of a President 
who opposed the legislation and imputing them to a Congress that 
rejected those views when it overrode his veto.36 A careful review of 
the legislative history of section 21D(b)(2) shows that Congress intended 
to adopt the "strong-inference" pleading standard from Second Circuit 
case law and to leave courts free to seek guidance from the existing 
precedents whenever appropriate.37 Indeed, the legislative history 
shows that the bill's leading proponents intended for allegations of 
motive, opportunity, and recklessness to raise a strong inference of 
scienter under section 21D(b)(2).38 Congress overrode President 
Clinton's veto because it believed he was wrong in thinking the 
Statement of Managers demanded more than Second Circuit case law 
required. 39 
Moreover, nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress 
intended to change the scienter standard for section 1 O(b) violations not 
involving forward-looking statements. Although initial drafts of the 
legislation required plaintiffs to plead and prove "that the defendant 
knew the statement was misleading at the time it was made, or 
intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would 
34. Id. at 16 ( emphasis added). 
35. See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 345-67 and accompanying text. 
37. Id. 
38. See infra notes 356-67 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra notes 345-67 and accompanying text. 
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render misleading the statements made at the time they were made,''4° 
such a requirement was removed---except with respect to "forward-
looking statements.',41 
In short, section 21D(b) adopts a uniform national standard for 
pleading securities-fraud claims that is based on existing pleading 
standards from the Ninth Circuit for pleading falsity, and from the 
Second Circuit on how plaintiffs may raise "a strong inference" of 
sci enter. 
IL THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF SECTION 21D(b) 
A. The Text and Structure of Section 2JD(b) and 
Related Provisions in the PSLRA 
Enacted as part of the PSLRA, Exchange Act section 21D(b) restates 
the pleading standards for Exchange Act securities-fraud actions.42 But 
the pleading standards are not new. Subsection (b )( 1) restates a pleading 
rule developed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),43 which the 
Ninth Circuit construed to require complaints alleging fraud not only to 
identify the statements alleged to be misleading, but also to explain how 
or why those statements were misleading.44 Subsection (b)(2) restates 
the requirement, developed in the Second Circuit, that a complaint 
alleging fraud should set forth facts raising a "strong inference" of 
40. H.R. I 0, § 204 ( 1995) ( emphasis added). 
41. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text. 
42. Exchange Act section 21 D(b) provides: 
(b) Requirements for Securities Fraud Actions. -
(I) Misleading statements and omissions. - In any private action arising 
under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant -
(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or 
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were 
made, not misleading; 
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been mislead-
ing, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that 
belief is formed. 
(2) Required state of mind. - In any private action arising under this title 
in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the 
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with 
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l)-(2) (1995). 
43. See FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b). 
44. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
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scienter.45 By combining the two rules, Congress created a new, 
stronger pleading standard that comprises the Second Circuit's standard 
for pleading scienter and the Ninth Circuit's standard for pleading 
falsity. 
1. Section 21D(b)(l) s Standard for Pleading Falsity 
Section 21D(b)(l) states that in any Exchange Act case based on 
misleading statements, "the complaint shall specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement ... 
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."46 This is, 
undoubtedly, a codification of case law applying Rule 9(b)'s provision 
that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."47 It is, in fact, 
a codification of the Ninth Circuit standard for pleading falsity which 
applies Rule 9(b ), to require plaintiffs alleging fraud to specify the 
substance of what was said, along with some explanation of why the 
statements were misleading.48 
The Ninth Circuit's Rule 9(b) precedents held that a complaint 
alleging fraud "must state precisely the time, place, and nature of the 
misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts of fraud," 
and that '"the allegations should include the misrepresentations 
themselves with particularity and, where possible, the roles of the 
individual defendants in the misrepresentations. "'49 With an en bane 
decision in In re GlenFed Sec. Litig.,50 the Ninth Circuit clarified its 
requirement that plaintiffs explain how a statement is false: 
The time, place, and content of an alleged misrepresentation may identify the 
statement or the omission complained of, but these circumstances do not 
45. See infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text. 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I) (1995) (emphasis added). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
48. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1996); Fecht v. 
Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1995); In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 
F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane); Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 
1994); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). 
49. Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Moore v. Kayport 
Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
50. 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
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"constitute" fraud. The statement in question must be false to be fraudulent. 
Accordingly, our cases have consistently required that circumstances indicating 
falseness be set forth . . . . To allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must 
set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The 
plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why 
it is false. In other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why 
the statement or omission complained of was false or misleading. A plaintiff 
might do less and still identify the statement complained of; indeed, the plaintiff 
might do less and still set forth some of the circumstances of the fraud. But the 
plaintiff cannot do anything less and still comply with Rule 9(b )'s mandate to 
set forth with particularity those circumstances which constitute the fraud.51 
In GlenFed, the court rejected objections that plaintiffs cannot be 
required to plead evidentiary facts to show falsity, explaining that "Rule 
9(b) requires particularity as to the circumstances of the fraud---this 
requires pleading facts that by any definition are 'evidentiary': time, 
place, persons, statements made, ex}?1anation of why or how such 
statements are false or misleading." 2 Hence, "GlenFed requires a 
plaintiff to plead evidentiary facts and the court to consider what 
inferences these facts will support."53 Under GlenFed, "a plaintiff may 
'draw on contemporaneous statements or conditions' to demonstrate why 
statements were false when made," and "allegations of specific problems 
undermining a defendant's optimistic claims suffice to explain how the 
claims are false."54 
However, other federal courts did not consistently construe Rule 9(b) 
to demand such particularized pleading of misrepresentations and reasons 
for falsity. 55 Some Second Circuit decisions, such as Cosmas v. 
Hassett,56 imposed a similar pleading standard, stating that a complaint 
alleging fraud "must adequately specify the statements it claims were 
false or misleading and give particulars as to the res~ect in which 
plaintiffs contend the statements were fraudulent .... " 7 But others 
held that "[t]o pass muster under rule 9(b), the complaint must allege the 
time, place, speaker, and sometimes even the content of the alleged 
51. Id. ( emphasis added). 
52. Id. at 1547-48 n.7. 
53. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1982); see Warshaw v. Xoma 
Corp., 74 F.3d 955,960 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In GlenFed we explained that a plaintiff must 
plead evidentiary facts that support inferences sufficient to meet the specificity 
requirements of Rule 9(b)."); Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1082. 
54. Id. at 1083 (quoting In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549) (9th 
Cir. I 994); see Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. I 996). 
55. Compare Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 
791 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It is certainly true that allegations of 'date, place or time' fulfill 
[Rule 9(b)'s requirements], but nothing in the rule requires them.")(emphasis added). 
56. 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989). 
57. Id. at II; see also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, I I 75 (2d Cir. 
1993); McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1992); Goldman v. Belden, 
754 F.2d 1059, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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misrepresentation, "58 suggesting that specification of statements' 
content, and the reasons why they were misleading, was the exception 
rather than the rule.59 There was no clear rule then, even in the Second 
Circuit, that plaintiffs specify the content of what was said and explain 
why it was false or misleading. 
Even courts that required plaintiffs to set forth the content of the 
statements alleged to be misleading typically did not require plaintiffs to 
explain how or why those statements were false. The Seventh Circuit 
held that under Rule 9(b), "[a]lthough plaintiffs must specifically identify 
allegedly fraudulent statements, they are not required 'to plead facts that 
if true would show that the defendant's alleged misrepresentations were 
indeed false. ",6° The Second Circuit joined most other courts61 in 
holding that, with the exception of allegations of scienter, "a complainant 
58. Ouaknine v. Mcfarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (sustaining com-
plaint)(citations omitted). 
59. Id.; accord, e.g., JUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1057 
(2d Cir. 1993) ("This Court has construed Rule 9(b) to require a complaint alleging fraud 
to 'allege the time, place, speaker and sometimes even the content of the alleged 
misrepresentation."') (quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79); Update Traffic Sys. v. Gould, 
857 F. Supp. 274, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[I]t is sufficient to allege the 'time, place, 
speaker, and sometimes even the content of the alleged misrepresentation"') ( quoting 
Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79). 
60. Katz v. Household Int'!, 36 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Uni*Quality, Inc. v. lnfotronix, Inc., 974 F.2d 918,923 (7th Cir. 1992)). Judge Posner 
explained that in the Seventh Circuit: 
The reported cases involve misrepresentations, the commonest kind of fraud, 
and merely require the plaintiff to state in his complaint 'the identity of the 
person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the 
misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was 
communicated to the plaintiff. . . . They do not require him to plead facts 
showing that the representation is indeed false. 
Bankers Tr. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677,683 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis 
added)( citations omitted); see also Midwest Commerce Banking Co. v. Elkhart City 
Centre, 4 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1993) (in a case alleging fraud, Rule 9(b) does not 
require "allegations demonstrating the falsity of any representations or omissions"); 
Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. GN Holdings, 873 F. Supp. 111, I 18 n.11 (N.D. Ill.) ("Rule 
9(b) does not require particularized pleading of ... facts that if true would show that the 
defendant's alleged misrepresentations were indeed false.") (emphasis in original), aff'd 
67 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1995). 
61. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1225 (1st Cir. 1996); 
Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'!, 901 F.2d 404,430 n.92 (5th Cir. 1990); Michaels 
Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674,680 & n.9 (6th Cir. 1988); Seattle-First 
Nat'! Bank v. Carlstedt, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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is not required to plead evidence"62 to satisfy Rule 9(b )'s particularity 
requirement.63 Section 21D(b)(l) adopts the stronger Ninth Circuit rule 
by providing that "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to 
have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is 
misleading."64 
GlenFed's requirement that plaintiffs plead facts explaining how and 
why a statement is misleading is restated in section 21D(b)(l), moderat-
ed by the qualification that "if an allegation regarding the statement or 
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state 
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."65 In many 
securities cases, of course, there is no need to plead "on information and 
belief."66 Nonetheless, this clause effectively codifies the Ninth 
Circuit's holding in Wool v. Tandem Computers, lnc. 67 that fraud may 
be alleged on information and belief "if the allegations are accompanied 
by a statement of the facts upon which the belief is founded."68 In 
62. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1974); see 
also Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979). A recent district 
court decision summarized the Second Circuit's precedents: 
The Court of Appeals has indeed held in some circumstances that "[t]o pass 
muster under rule 9(b), the complaint must allege the time, place, speaker, 
and sometimes even the content of the alleged misrepresentation." However, 
it is equally true that "a complainant is not required to plead evidence." 
In re Blech Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Ouaknine, 
897 F.2d at 79, and Schlick, 507 F.2d at 379 (citations omitted). 
63. The Second Circuit did require plaintiffs to plead facts constituting 
circumstantial evidence of scienter in order to raise a "strong inference" of the required 
state of mind, but only if allegations of motive and opportunity were absent. See infra 
notes 330-35 and accompanying text. 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l) (1995). 
65. Id. 
66. Professors Wright and Miller write: 
[P]leading on information and belief is not an appropriate form of pleading if 
the matter is within the personal knowledge of the pleader or "presumptively" 
within his knowledge . . . . Thus, matters of public record or matters generally 
known in the community should not be alleged on information and belief 
inasmuch as everyone is held to be conversant with them. 
5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§1224, at 206 (2d ed. 1990). In open-market fraud cases, allegations regarding a 
publicly-traded issuer's public misrepresentations and omissions often deal with matters 
that became generally known to the financial community with a negative public 
disclosure that contradicted the issuer's earlier statements. Other allegations may deal 
with facts within the knowledge of counsel after careful prefiling investigation, and 
therefore need not be made "on information and belief." 
67. 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987). 
68. Id. at 1439; accord Moore v, Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 
540 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule I l(b) expressly permits allegations on the basis ofa "person's 
knowledge, information, and belief." FED. R. Clv. P. I l(b). Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has held that a complaint alleging fraud on "information and belief' complies with 
Rule 11, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 ( 1966), and that nothing in any 
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Wool, the Ninth Circuit observed that "'[a]llegations of fraud based on 
information and belief usually do not satisfy the degree of particularity 
required under Rule 9(b),",69 but held that '"an exception exists where, 
as in cases of corporate fraud, the plaintiffs cannot be expected to have 
personal knowledge of the facts constituting the wrongdoing. "'70 An 
allegation of fraud made on information and belief must be accepted if 
"[ e ]ach alleged misstatement is identified by content, date, and the 
document or announcement in which it appeared, [along with] the 
manner in which such representations were false and misleading."71 
Thus, section 21D(b)(l) codifies Ninth Circuit law on pleading 
statements, and their falsity, with particularity. 
of the Federal Rules can be construed to require dismissal of such a complaint. Id. at 
373 (emphasis added); see Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1971). 
69. Id. at 1439 (emphasis added) (quoting Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F.Supp. 39, 42 
(S.D.Cal. I 982)). 
70. Id. In such cases, "the allegations should include the misrepresentations 
themselves with particularity and, where possible, the roles of the individual defendants 
in the misrepresentations." Kayport, 885 F.2d at 540 (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers 
Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)); see Rolex Employees Retirement Trust v. 
Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. I 042, I 047 (D. Or. I 990). Some Second Circuit 
decisions recognized a similar rule. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 
F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir. 1994). 
71. Wool, 818 F.2d at 1440. Wool flatly rejected contentions that allegations made 
entirely on "information and belief' were defective in all circumstances: "Applying these 
principles to the complaint filed by Wool, we conclude that the particularity requirement 
of Rule 9(b) has been met. Although Wool's complaint is based on the SEC's allega-
tions, the paragraphs alleging misleading statements, misrepresentations, and specific acts 
of fraud are very precise." Id. at 1439-40. The fact that the complaint relied upon the 
SEC's allegations, rather than on counsel's own investigation, apparently was taken to 
mean that those allegations were based on "information and belief." Nonetheless, the 
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b) because the allegedly misleading statements were 
"identified by content, date, and the document or announcement in which [they] 
appeared," and the complaint specified "the manner in which such representations were 
false and misleading." Id. at 1440; accord. e.g., Flashman v. Singleton, [1990-1991 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ',r95,872, at 93,313 (N.D. Cal. I 991); Wegbreit 
v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Rolex 
Employees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Or. 
1990); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
',r94,485, at 93,095 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Cincinnati Microwave, Inc. v. Wilson, 705 F. Supp. 
1453, 1457 (D. Nev. 1989); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 273 (N.D. 
Tex.), recons. denied, 739 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. Tex. 1990). 
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2. Section 21D(b)(2) 's Standard for Pleading Scienter 
Section 21D(b)(2) provides that a complaint shall "state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind. "72 The "strong inference" 
standard comes from Second Circuit case law, which has long held that 
plaintiffs alleging fraud should raise a "strong inference" of scien-
ter-with allegations of motive and opportunity, or by pleading facts that 
suggest either reckless or conscious behavior. 73 
The Second Circuit began to demand that plaintiffs alleging fraud 
plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter in the late 
1970s.74 Rule 9(b) states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity."75 But the rule further states that "[m]alice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally."76 This was long understood to mean that plaintiffs alleging 
fraud are not required to plead any facts from which scienter may be 
inferred.77 However, in 1979 the Second Circuit held in Ross v. A.H. 
Robins Co.78 that plaintiffs who allege that defendants knew statements 
were false "can be required to supply a factual basis for their conclusory 
allegations regarding that knowledge."79 The court considered it 
"reasonable to require that the plaintiffs specifically plead those events 
which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had 
knowledge of the facts" allegedly making their statements misleading.80 
Since then, the Second Circuit has regularly held that although "'great 
specificity [is] not required with respect to . . . allegations of ... 
scienter,"' a plaintiff must nonetheless provide some factual basis raising 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995). 
73. See, e.g., Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Koenig, 
25 F.3d 1168, I I 73-74 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 
268-69 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); JUE AFL-CIO Pension 
Fund v. Hermann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994); 
Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1991); Ouaknine v. 
Macfarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12-13 
(2d Cir. 1989); Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Ross v. A.H. Robins & Co., 607 F.2d 545, 556 (2d Cir. 1979). 
74. Ross, 607 F.2d at 556. 
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774-75 (D. Colo. 1964); Love 
v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 481, 481-82 (S,D. Miss. 1939). 
78. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979). 
79. Id. at 558. 
80. Id. ( emphasis added). 
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at least a "strong inference" of scienter.81 Indeed, "conclusory allega-
tions of scienter are sufficient 'if supported by facts giving rise to a 
'strong inference' of fraudulent intent. "'82 
The required "strong inference" of scienter may be raised through 
either of two approaches. 83 "The first approach is to allege facts 
establishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so."84 
"The second approach is to allege facts constituting circumstantial 
evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior."85 
Under the "motive and opportunity" test, opportunity is often present. 
When a corporation and its management have allegedly perpetrated a 
fraud on the market, "no one doubts that the defendants [ would have] 
had the opportunity, if they wished, to manipulate the price of the 
[company's] stock."86 Motive may then be provided by a variety of 
factors, such as the company's desire to raise money with an offering of 
81. Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see 
Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 
9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993); JUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Hermann, 9 F.3d 
1049, 1057 (2d Cir. 1993); Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 
I 991); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d I 059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985). As the Court explained 
in Ouaknine v. MacFarlane: 
Allegations of scienter are not subjected to the more exacting consideration 
applied to the other components of fraud. They are sufficient where, as here, 
the allegations lie peculiarly within the opposing parties' knowledge and are 
accompanied by information that raises a strong inference of fraud. 
897 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); accord Breard, 941 F.2d at 143 
(quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 81). 
82. IUE, 9 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 80). The determination 
must be made "accepting as true the factual allegations in the liberally construed 
[c]omplaint, and drawing all inferences in favor of the pleader ... " Id. at 1058; see 
Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. I 989); Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition 
Institute, Inc., 751 F.2d 555,562 (2d Cir. 1984); McCoy v. Goldberg, 883 F. Supp. 927, 
936 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
83. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69. 
84. Id. at 269; accord In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 
1993) ("allegations of motive and opportunity in the complaint are sufficient to establish 
a basis for inferring ... fraudulent intent"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994). Such 
a basis may be shown through allegations of motive to deceive and access to accurate 
information. Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1173-74. 
85. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Beck v. 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1005 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds; United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 
1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (en bane); In re Network Equipment Technologies Inc. Litig., 762 
F. Supp. 1359, 1362-63 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
86. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1174; RMED Int'! Inc. 
v. Sloan's Supermarket, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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securities. 87 The opportunity for insiders to sell stock at artificially-
inflated prices similarly provides a motive that raises "a strong 
inference" of fraudulent intent.88 Decisions applying the Second Circuit 
87. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269-70. In Time Warner, the Second Circuit held that 
a rights offering provided a motive to manipulate the price of securities, "thereby 
enabling the company to set the rights offering price somewhat higher than would have 
been possible without the misleading statements and to lessen the dilutive effect of the 
offering." Id. at 269. This motive---the desire to obtain a higher price for a securities 
offering--raises a strong inference of scienter under Second Circuit law. Id. at 269-70. 
A potential merger or acquisition also provides a recognized motive for securities fraud. 
Fleet Nat'/ Bank v. Anchor Medica Television, 831 F. Supp. 16, 40 (D.R.I. 1993) 
("Although a motive to profit is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding of scienter and 
intent to deceive, the jury was entitled to consider [defendant 'sf incentive to try and 
pump up the purchase price as circumstantial evidence of intent to deceive.") ( emphasis 
added); In In re Lotus Development Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D. Mass. 
1995) ("Plaintiffs make well-pied allegations of motive. They allege that all of the 
defendants gained heavily from an artificially inflated stock price during the class period: 
the insiders through sizable sales of their personal stock holdings; and the company 
through an important stock-financed acquisition."); In re PNC Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 96,865, at 93,523 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (denying denied 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b) based upon plaintiff's allegations that "PNC and the 
individual defendants allegedly were motivated by a desire to perpetuate PNC's ability 
to acquire banks at the lowest possible cost and thus with the minimum dilution to 
existing shareholders"). 
88. See Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. I 989). In Cosmas, the Second 
Circuit held that allegations that a section I O(b) violation would permit insiders to sell 
stock at inflated prices provided a "strong inference that the defendants possessed the 
requisite fraudulent intent." Id. at 12-13. The court explained that: 
[T]he allegations in the amended complaint herein do establish a motive. The 
amended complaint asserts that the defendants owned shares of Inflight (,6) 
and that the allegedly fraudulent statements artificially inflated or maintained 
the prices of Inflight securities (,38). As we stated in Goldman, 754 F.2d at 
I 070: "the . . . implication of the Complaint is that the alleged failure to 
qualify the bullish statements was intended to permit individual defendants to 
profit from an inflated market price before the truth became known." 
Id. at 13 (citing Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985)); accord 
Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1174; see In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholder Litig., 898 
F. Supp. 974, 980 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical 
Corp, 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1312-13 (1996). 
Such holdings find support in precedents from other circuits, which hold that insider 
stock sales raise an inference of scienter- both at the pleading stage and at later stages 
when courts hold that insider sales can support a jury verdict of scienter. See, e.g., 
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994) (insider sales of$760,599 raise 
an inference of scienter at the pleading stage); In re 3COM Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp. 
1411, 1417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (insider sales of $2 million raise an inference of 
scienter). The Ninth Circuit, and other courts, have long held that "[i]nsider trading in 
suspicious amounts or at suspicious times is probative of bad faith and sci enter." In re 
Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 
943 ( I 990); accord Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F .3d 1194, 1224 ( I st Cir. 
1996); In re Cryomedical Sciences, Inc. Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1001, 1020 (D. Md. 
1995). 
In Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that the 
opportunity to sell options raised an inference of scienter under Second Circuit standards. 
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standard hold that a professional--.such as an auditor---may have a 
reason to intentionally or recklessly ignore facts that make its profession-
al certification of financial statements misleading, because it desires to 
maintain a profitable financial relationship or to conceal shortcomings 
in its own prior work.89 
The Second Circuit's second approach for alleging scienter allows 
plaintiffs to identify circumstances indicating reckless or conscious 
behavior.90 The knowledge or recklessness of an individual may be 
inferred from his or her position within a company, or functions in a 
particular transaction, and likely access to material information.91 
See Deutsch, 823 F.2d at 1365 & n.3; In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 
1547 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that Deutsch applied Second Circuit law). In Kaplan 
v. Rose, the Ninth Circuit held that scienter may be found on the basis of insider stock 
sales "'in amounts dramatically out of line with prior trading practices at times 
calculated to maximize personal benefit from undisclosed inside information."' Kaplan 
v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 
F .2d at 1117). 
More recently, in Fecht v. Price Co., the Ninth Circuit held that a corporate offering 
of securities and insider stock sales demonstrated knowledge of falsity. 70 F.3d I 078 
(9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant Price Co. and its officers had made 
unduly optimistic statements in order to inflate the price of the Company's securities. 
Id. at I 084. Two top executives sold stock during the period of the alleged fraud, and 
the Company itself raised money with an offering of Real Estate Investment Trust 
("REIT") securities. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]hese sales are circumstantial 
evidence that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the financial condition of 
the Company was deteriorating well before they disclosed the problems with the 
expansion program." Id. 
89. District courts in the Second Circuit explain that under such circumstances, 
[t]he defendant is motivated not to 'open his eyes' to the underlying facts, 
since this would place him in a position of terminating his profitable financial 
situation and exposing his associat[ion with], or continuing to participate in the 
fraudulent activity, but now without his cherished modicum of deniability. 
The combination of this motivation and otherwise unlikely degree of mere 
carelessness gives rise to an inference of deliberate disregard for the facts. 
In re Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(quoting In re Fischbach Sec. Litig., 1992 WL 8715, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1992)). 
In United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit affirmed 
accountants• criminal convictions, observing that the jury could have reasonably found 
that the accountants were motivated by a desire to "conceal the alleged dereliction of 
their predecessors and themselves in former years." Id. at 808; see Elliott J. Weiss, The 
New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 675, 702 & n. I 64 (I 996). 
90. See Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Beck, 820 F.2d at 50; RMED Int'!, Inc. v. 
Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 16, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
91. See, e.g., Breard, 941 F.2d at 144; Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 13; Cohen, 25 F.3d 
at 1174; In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 979-
909 
For example, in Cosmas v. Hassett,92 the complaint alleged that the 
Inflight Corporation made optimistic statements about revenues and 
projected sales that were false or misleading because the People's 
Republic of China ("PRC") had imposed new import restrictions that 
corporate directors must have known would adversely affect the 
company's sales to that country.93 The Second Circuit held that the 
complaint raised a strong inference of scienter because corporate 
directors were in a position to know of the import restrictions and their 
likely effect on the company's business.94 
In Cohen v. Koenig,95 the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff raised 
a strong inference of scienter by pleading facts suggesting that defen-
dants likely knew that their financial representations about the Koenig 
Group were false.96 The fact that the defendants "were officers, 
directors and majority shareholders of the Koenig Group and were active 
managers and ... [thus] fully familiar with all aspects of Koenig 
Group's business and financial conditions and operations" was sufficient 
to show that the defendants, more likely than not, knew their financial 
representations were false-and thus scienter was successfully alleged.97 
80 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Richland v. Syn-Fuel Assoc., 879 F. Supp. 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). Of course, a corporate defendant must be deemed to act with the knowledge of 
its employees and agents---including the individual defendants. See Hanon v. 
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992) (corporation "through its 
responsible employees, knew about" the problems that made its public statements false 
or misleading); see also United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (I st 
Cir.); Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. T.I.M.E. - D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974). 
92. 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989). 
93. Id. at 10-12. 
94. Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 13. The Court explained: 
[T]he amended complaint herein satisfies the sci enter requirement of Rule 9(b ). 
As already discussed, the amended complaint alleges facts from which one can 
reasonably infer that sales to the PRC were to represent a significant part of 
Inflight's business. These facts give rise to a strong inference that the 
defendants, who the amended complaint alleges were directors oflnflight, had 
knowledge of the PRC import restrictions, since the restrictions apparently 
eliminated a potentially significant source of income for the company. In light 
of the strong inference that the defendants, at the time the allegedly fraudulent 
statements were made, had knowledge of the PRC import restrictions, we 
conclude that the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts from which it can 
be inferred that the defendants had the requisite fraudulent intent. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
95. 25 F.3d I 168 (2d Cir. 1994). 
96. Id. at 1174. 
97. Id.; see also In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholder Litig., 898 F. 
Supp. 974, 979-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (directors' positions on audit committee and their 
signatures on a prospectus raise a strong inference of scienter regarding massive 
accounting fraud). 
910 
(VOL. 33: 893, 1996) Reform Act of 1995 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
A professional's position similarly can raise a strong inference of 
scienter with respect to material omissions from documents the 
professional participated in drafting. For example, in Breard v. Sachnoff 
& Weaver,98 allegations that a law firm participated in drafting an 
offering memorandum that failed to disclose an individual's criminal 
conviction raised a strong inference of scienter because omission of this 
material information could be considered reckless.99 The inference of 
scienter was strengthened by the fact that the law firm then drafted a 
supplemental offering memorandum which disclosed the fact but tried 
to minimize it, characterizing it as "immaterial."100 
The many kinds of facts that can be relied upon to survive a summary 
judgment motion or to establish scienter at trial also should be capable 
of raising "a strong inference" of scienter at the pleading stage. Thus, 
accounting violations can help to provide a basis for inferring scien-
ter.101 Violations of specific accounting rules can raise an inference 
98. 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991). 
99. Id. at 144 & n.3. "Indeed, Sachnoff's failure to mention Berg's conviction in 
the initial offering memorandum could be considered reckless as a matter of law." Id. 
at 144. The Second Circuit reversed a district court's holding that the complaint "failed 
to allege any fact from which it could be inferred that '[Sachnoff] had knowledge or 
should have had knowledge of the alleged fraud."' Id. at 143. It instead held that 
allegations the law firm "participated in drafting" an offering memorandum, but 
overlooked material information, did raise a strong inference of recklessness. Id. at I 44-
45. Compare In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 625-29 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that scienter may be inferred from professionals' access to undisclosed 
material information). 
Id. 
100. Breard, 941 F.2d at 144. The Second Circuit explained: 
Moreover, once Sachnoff learned that Berg ... had just been convicted for 
mail fraud and conspiracy, Sachnoff should have informed itself of the nature 
and extent of Berg's criminal acts, and should have conducted some sort of 
independent investigation of the facts supplied by Berg. Failure to do so 
before offering the opinion in the supplemental offering memorandum that 
Berg's criminal past was 'immaterial' could therefore be considered reckless. 
See Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256, 259 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("An egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate 
the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of ... reckless-
ness."). 
IOI. See Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 478-79 4th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1969); Marksman Partners v. Chantal 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. at 1313-15; In re Chambers Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 
F. Supp. 619-20 (W.D. Pa. 1994). 
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f . h . h . d t io2 o sc1enter t at 1s strong enoug to overcome summary JU gmen . 
In the Second Circuit, manipulation of accounting rules to report greater 
revenues and earnings raises an inference of scienter sufficient not just 
to overcome a motion to dismiss, but to defeat summary judgment as 
well. w3 In the Ninth Circuit, violation of accounting rules can raise 
an inference of scienter strong enough to support a criminal conviction 
for securities fraud-beyond a reasonable doubt. 104 Even under 
circumstances where evidence of inaccurate accounting figures, or a 
misapplication of generally accepted accounting principles, might not by 
itself necessarily establish scienter, a showing that a corporate defendant 
violated its own policies to recognize revenue is enough to survive a 
summary-judgment motion.105 
By using the Second Circuit's "strong inference" formulation, section 
21D(b)(2) on its face adopts the Second Circuit standard for pleading 
scienter. Had Congress intended to abrogate the Second Circuit pre-
cedents creating and interpreting the "strong inference" pleading 
standard, it would not have e~licitly adopted the Second Circuit's 
"strong inference" formulation. 1 Nothing in section 21D(b )(2)'s text 
102. Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, 908 F. Supp. 323,328 (M.D.N.C. 1995) 
( evidence of GAAP violations sufficient for an inference of sci enter at the summary 
judgment stage); In re MTC Elec. Technologies Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 
980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (allegations that defendants signed a prospectus containing false 
financial statements when defendants were responsible for overseeing company's 
accounting sufficiently pleads sci enter at the motion-to-dismiss stage); Ades v. Deloitte 
& Touche, 799 F. Supp. 1493, 1499 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (strong inference based on 
allegations of facts indicating auditors had become aware of conditions forming basis of 
violations of accounting and auditing rules); Duke v. Touche Ross & Co., 765 F. Supp. 
69, 75-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (strong inference based on allegations accounting firm had 
knowledge of underlying facts because of its duty to conduct a review and the extreme 
unreasonableness of its assumptions). 
103. Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1984). 
104. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United 
States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1494-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (sustaining criminal ftaud 
convictions on the basis of GAAP violations). 
105. Provenz v. Miller, Nos. 95-15839, 95-16819, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33085, 
at *28-*29 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 1996). The Ninth Circuit also has held that allegations of 
a scheme to inflate financial statements raise an itiference of specific intent to defraud 
at the pleading stage. E.g., Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988); Sun 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1987). To the extent 
these pleading decisions were overruled by GlenFed's en bane holding that no inference 
ofscienter is required to be pleaded, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545-47 (9th Cir. 1995), they have 
been revived by the new Act's express requirement of a strong inference of scienter. 
The same is true of Ninth Circuit district court cases that applied Second Circuit law to 
find a strong inference of scienter. See, e.g., Network Equipment Technologies Inc. 
Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359, 1362-63 (1991); 3COM Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp. at 1417-18; 
In re Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
194,960, at 95,372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
106. See Marksman Partners. L.P., 927 F.Supp. 1297, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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suggests that it overrules the Second Circuit case law,107 whose very 
language it adopts, on what kind of facts can suffice to raise "a strong 
inference" of intentional fraud or recklessness. 108 
3. Section 21D(b)(2) s Preservation of Existing 
Standards of Liability 
Section 21D(b)(2) requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind,"109 and the "required state of mind" for Section 
lO(b) violations has long included recklessness. Section 21D(b)(2) 
preserves existing law for the state of mind necessary to establish 
liablity---except where Congress has expressly changed the required state 
of mind, as for certain forward-looking statements.U0 
The Supreme Court held in 1976 that scienter is an element ofliability 
under section lO(b),111 observing that "[i]n certain areas of the law 
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct."112 
Since then, the circuit courts have uniformly held that the required state 
of mind for a section lO(b) action is knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard. 113 One circuit after another adopted the so-called 
"Sundstrand standard" for recklessness, which was first articulated in 
I 07. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
108. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) 
(1995). 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995)(emphasis added). 
110. "Scienter may be satisfied by either proof of actual knowledge or reckless-
ness." Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497,507 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hollinger 
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
11 l. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
112. /d.atl94n.12. 
113. See, e.g., Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); McLean v. Alexander, 
599 F.2d 1190, I I 97 (3d Cir. I 979); Broad v. Rockwell Int'! Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 960-
61 (5th Cir 1981) (en bane); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 
(6th Cir. 1979); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 
1977); Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1534 (8th Cir. 1996); Van Dyke 
v. Coburn Enterprises, Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 
F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 
(9th Cir. 1990) (en bane); Anixter v. Home Products, Inc., 77 F.3d 1215, 1232-33 & 
n.20 (10th Cir. 1996); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (I Ith Cir. 1985); SEC v. Steadman, 967 
F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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Franke v. Mid-Western Oklahoma Development Authority, 114 and 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand Corp. v. SunChemical 
Corp .. 115 Under the Sundstrand standard: 
'[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, 
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so 
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.' 116 
This formulation became a uniform national standard for scienter under 
section lO(b ), explicitly adopted and applied by the First, 117 Sec-
ond, 118 Third, 119 Fifth, 120 Sixth, 121 Seventh, 122 Eighth, 123 
Ninth, 124 Tenth, 125 Eleventh, 126 and District of Columbia127 Cir-
cuits--as well as by district courts in the Fourth Circuit. 128 
Against this background, Congress' choice of "the required state of 
mind, " 129 necessarily preserves recklessness as a basis of liability for 
most section lO(b) claims. "A fundamental canon of statutory construc-
tion is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 
their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" in use at the time 
Congress enacted the statute. 130 Because the many decisions holding 
that recklessness satisfies section lO(b )'s scienter requirement were part 
of the "contemporary legal context" presumably known to Congress and 
left undisturbed by the text of section 21D(b)(2), they provide "the 
114. 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
115. 553 F.2d at I 033, I 044-45 (7th Cir. I 979). 
I 16. Id. at 1045 (citation omitted). 
117. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509,516 (1st Cir. 1978); Cook v. 
Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978). 
118. Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47. , 
119. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Mclean v. 
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, I 197-98 (3d Cir. 1979). 
120. Broad v. Rockwell Intn'l. Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir. 1994). 
121. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 1980). 
122. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d I 033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
123. K&S Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971,978 (8th Cir. 1991). 
124. Hollinger v. Titan, 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1990). 
125. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, II 18 (10th Cir. 1982). 
126. SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (I Ith Cir. 1982). 
127. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
128. PPM America, Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 875 F. Supp. 289, 301-02 (D. Md. 1995); 
Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 740 (W.D. Va. 1982). 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. 1996). 
130. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 (1979). 
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required state of mind" for the typical section lO(b) cause of action.m 
Had Congress intended to overrule the established law and require actual 
knowledge of falsity with section 21D(b)(2), it would have said so.132 
Indeed, when Congress intended, with the PSLRA, to limit liability for 
reckless conduct, it did say so. 133 Congress, in enacting a new section 
2l(E), chose to provide only a narrow "safe harbor" from recklessness 
liability. 134 The "safe harbor" protects specified defendants from 
liability for defined "forward-looking statements" unless plaintiff proves 
that such a statement was made with "actual knowledge" that the 
statement was false or misleading. 135 If a "forward-looking statement" 
comes within the "safe harbor," defendants avoid liability if the 
statement was "identified as a forward-looking statement, and [was] 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important 
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in 
the forward-looking statement," or if the plaintiff fails to prove that the 
statement "was made with actual knowledge" that it was false or 
131. See Cottage Savings Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1991) 
(Congress presumably codified decisions that "were part of the 'contemporary legal 
context' in which Congress enacted" a statute) ( quoting Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979)); Associated General Contractors v. California 
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,532 (1983) ("Just as the substantive content 
of the Sherman Act draws meaning from its common-law antecedents, so must we 
consider the contemporary legal context in which Congress acted when we try to 
ascertain the intended scope of the private remedy created by §7."); Herman & MacLean 
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983) (assuming Congress acted with knowledge 
of Section I0(b) precedents when it revised the securities laws in 1975). As the 
Supreme Court explained in Lorilland v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-8 I ( 1978): 
Congress is presumed to be aware of administrative or judicial interpretation 
of a statute and to adopt tbat interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change . . . . So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating 
sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had 
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar 
as it affects the new statute. 
Id. at 580-81 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S. Inc. v. Primary 
Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 135 (1990); Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. 197, 211 
(1988); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985); 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,381 n.66 (1982). 
132. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 
1309 & n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
133. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. 1996). 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 1996). 
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misleading. 136 To establish liability for a statement within the "safe 
harbor," plaintiffs must show that the statement, "if made by a natural 
person, was made with actual knowledge by that person that the 
statement was false or misleading; or ... if made by a business entity 
... was made or approved by [an] officer with actual knowledge by that 
136. The "safe harbor" for qualifying forward-looking statements states, in relevant 
part: . 
( c) Safe Harbor. -
(I) In general. - Except as provided in subsection (b) [which excludes 
many statements from the safe harbor], in any private action arising 
under this title that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omission of a material fact necessary to make the statement not mislead-
ing, a person referred to in subsection (a) [limited to periodically 
reporting issuers and their agents} shall not be liable with respect to 
any.forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the 
extent that -
(A) the forward looking statement is -
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that 
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the 
forward-looking statement; or 
(ii) immaterial; or 
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement -
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge by 
that person that the statement was false or misleading; or 
(ii) if made by a business entity; was -
(I) made with the approval of an executive officer of that entity; and 
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge by that 
officer that the statement was false or misleading. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
The disjunctive text of the statute raises a question as to whether persons defined by 
subsection (a) are free to lie in a forward-looking statement so long as the statements 
"identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ 
materially from those in the forward-looking statement." 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(l)(A)(i) 
(Supp. 1996). SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. commented that "a person who makes 
a deliberate lie with the purpose and intent of defrauding investors cannot provide 
'meaningful' warnings to investors under the 'bespeaks caution' prong of the safe 
harbor." Letter from Arthur Levitt and Steven M.H. Wallman to Representatives John 
D. Dingell and Edward J. Markey, November 27, 1995, at 2 (copy on file with authors). 
On this basis, the provision's proponents emphatically denied that it could provide any 
"license to lie." See, e.g .. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7934 (Dec. 5, 1995) ("The safe harbor 
does not give a license to lie.") (statement of Sen. D'Amato); 141 CONG. REc. Sl7958 
(Dec. 5, 1995) ("The idea that this conference report contains any license to lie is simply 
and totally untrue .... ") (statement of Sen. Dodd); 141 CONG. REC. S17970 (Dec. 5, 
1995) ("The conference report's balanced safe harbor provision encourages companies 
to speak by recognizing that predictions are not promises, while prohibiting outright lies 
by corporate executives.") (statement of Sen. Domenici); 141 CONG. REC. SI 7911 (Dec. 
5, I 995) ("Executives who deliberately lie about their company's prospects would be 
liable under the compromise.") (statement of Sen. Reid). The Conference Report 
confirms that "boilerplate warnings will not suffice." H.R. CONF. REP. No. I 04-360, at 
43 (I 995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742. 
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officer that the statement was false or misleading."137 Section 21E's 
requirement of actual knowledge for certain claims based on forward-
looking statements cannot reasonably be extended to cover all other 
claims under section I O(b ). 138 "Expression unius est exclusio 
alterius. "139 Indeed, section 2 lE 's detailed specifications excluding 
many persons and statements from the safe harbor would be utterly 
frustrated if Section 21D were construed to require proof of actual 
knowledge in every case. 140 
Moreover, Exchange Act section 2l(g)'s proportionate liability 
provision limits the extent of defendants' liability for reckless conduct, 
while carefully preserving the rule that reckless conduct can give rise to 
liability. 141 The section also provides that it does not affect the basic 
scienter standards for establishing a violation of Section 1 O(b ): "Nothing 
in this subsection shall be construed to create, affect, or in any manner 
modify, the standard for liability associated with any action arising under 
the securities laws."142 The PSLRA thus expressly preserves the 
existing case law holding that recklessness suffices to establish the 
scienter element for a section lO(b) violation. Finally, when Congress 
restored the SEC authority to prosecute aiders and abettors, it limited 
aider-and-abettor liability to "any person that knowingly provides 
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c){l)(B)(i), (ii), (II) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
138. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 
1996). 
139. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (Supp. 1996) (extending protection only to certain 
issues of securities and their agents); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (Supp. I 996) (exclusions of 
many statements). 
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (Supp. 1996). Section 2l(g) provides that any defendant 
"against whom a final judgment is entered in a private action shall be liable for damages 
jointly and severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines that such covered 
person knowingly committed a violation of the securities laws." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(g)(2)(A). This section recognizes that "final judgment" may be entered without such 
a finding, but will result in joint-and-several liability only upon a finding of knowing 
conduct, and in less-sweeping "proportionate liability" on a finding of recklessness. 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2) (Supp. 1996). Section 2l(g)(I0) states that "(fjor purposes of this 
subsection [a defendant] 'knowingly commits a violation of the securities laws ... [only 
if it acts] with actual knowledge ... of [falsity]." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(IO) (Supp. 
1996). It specifies that for this subsection alone "reckless conduct by a covered person 
shall not be construed to constitute a knowing commission of a violation of the securities 
laws by that covered person .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(I0)(B) (Supp. 1996). 
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(l) (Supp. 1996). 
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substantial assistance to another person in violation of this chapter,"143 
although the case law had recognized recklessness as a ground for 
liability. 144 These specific changes show that Congress did not intend 
to raise the basic sci enter standard for all Section IO(b) actions. 
Because "forward-looking statements" within the safe harbor now 
require proof of actual knowledge of falsity,145 the "required state of 
mind" for some section IO(b) claims based on forward-looking 
statements is more than recklessness. But by using "the required state 
of mind" in section 21D(b)(2), Congress could require plaintiffs to plead 
facts raising a strong inference of knowledge only in cases based 
exclusively on forward-looking statements, while allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed on the basis of a strong inference of either conscious or reckless 
behavior in all other section lO(b) cases. 
III. DOES THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 2l(D)(b) 
CONTRADICT ITS TEXT? 
A. Legislative History and the Silicon Graphics and 
Marksman Partners Opinions 
Section 21D(b)(2) says that plaintiffs must "state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind."146 No one doubts that the "strong inference" 
language comes from the Second Circuit case law, or that the "required 
state of mind" for section JO(b) claims has long included both actual 
knowledge of falsity and recklessness. 141 Nothing in section 
21D(b)(2)'s statutory text appears to overrule Second Circuit "motive 
and opportunity" precedents on how a "strong inference" of scienter may 
be pleaded, or to eliminate liability for reckless violations of section 
JO(b). On the contrary, the statutory text apparently adopts the Second 
Circuit standard for alleging scienter and preserves knowing or reckless 
conduct as "the required state of mind" for most section lO(b) actions. 
Can legislative history be relied on, as it was in Silicon Graphics, to 
contradict this legislative text? And does the legislative history suggest 
Congress really intended to overrule precedents accepting allegations of 
l 43. l 5 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (Supp. 1996). The Supreme Court had abolished aided and 
abettor liability under Section l0(b) with its holding in Central Bank v. First Interstate 
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). 
144. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1288 n.l I (9th Cir. 1996); Levine v. 
Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991). 
145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995) (emphasis added). 
147. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
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motive, opportunity, and recklessness to establish scienter in section 
IO(b) cases? Both questions must be answered in the negative. 
Legislative history cannot be used to contradict unambiguous statutory 
text adopting the Second Circuit's "strong-inference" standard. 148 The 
Supreme Court has held that where statutory text "contains a phrase that 
is unambiguous--that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative 
and judicial practic(}-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted 
by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the 
course of the enactment process."149 Thus, a cryptic endnote in the 
Statement of the Managers cannot overpower the statutory text itself. 150 
Views of the legislation's opponents regarding that endnote's signifi-
148. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 552-53 (1987) 
(holding that "[w]hen statutory language is plain, and nothing in the Act's structure or 
relationship to other statutes calls into question this plain meaning, that is ordinarily 'the 
end of the matter."') (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); accord United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 
489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) ("[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and 
consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language 
of the statute."); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (holding that "there is no need 
to refer to the legislative history where the statutory language is clear."); Kenaitze Indian 
Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 318 (9th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Michigan Dept. of 
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (stating that "[l]egislative history is irrelevant 
to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute.") (citation omitted); Heam v. Western 
Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, 68 F.3d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Where the 
statute's language 'can be construed in a consistent and workable fashion,' we must put 
aside contrary legislative history.") (quoting Valentine v. Mobil Oil Corp., 789 F.2d 
1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
149. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) 
(emphasis added; citation omitted); Hearn, 68 F.3d at 304 ("[L]egislative history-no 
matter how clear--can't override statutory text."). 
150. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,648 (1961) (holding that statements in 
the legislative history "have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify 
deviation from the plain language of a statute."); see, e.g., Arcadia Ohio v. Ohio Power 
Co., 498 U.S. 73, 81 n.2 (I 990) ("[T]he legislative history is overborne by the text."). 
Professor Coffee aptly observes: 
[I]n Shannon v. United States, the Court confronted a statute whose conference 
report specifically "endorsed" a procedure used in one circuit by which the 
jury was given specific instructions in connection with the insanity defense. 
As clear and specific as this statement was, the Court still gave no weight to 
this congressional "endorsement" and instead adopted a very different 
procedure, stating "[w]e are not aware of any case ... in which we have given 
authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way 
anchored in the text of the statute." 
Coffee, supra note 28, at 981 (quoting Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 
(1994)). "From Shannon's perspective then, courts should simply focus on the statutory 
text and ignore the surplusage in the legislative history." Id. 
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cance--including those stated in the President's veto message--carry 
even less weight, for "views of opponents of a bill with respect to its 
meaning ... are not persuasive,"151 even with respect to ambiguous 
statutory provisions. 152 
Nonetheless, in Silicon Graphics Judge Smith relied on President 
Clinton's interpretation of the Statement of the Managers accompanying 
the Conference Committee Report153 on the PSLRA to hold that 
section 2 lD(b )(2) abrogates Second Circuit precedents allowing plaintiffs 
to raise "a strong inference" of scienter with allegations of motive, 
opportunity or recklessness. 154 As Silicon Graphics notes, when he 
vetoed the PSLRA, President Clinton stated that, although he could 
accept the Second Circuit "strong inference" pleading standard called for 
by the text of section 21D(b)(2), he feared "the conferees [made] crystal 
clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise the standard even 
beyond that level."155 That veto was subsequently overridden by 
Congress. 156 "Based on this legislative history," Judge Smith in 
Silicon Graphics "[found] that Congress did not intend to codify the 
Second Circuit standard" for pleading scienter157 and held that the 
PSLRA required proof of "knowing misrepresentation" in all cases.158 
151. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr., 485 U.S. 568, 585 
(1988); accord, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, Local 
760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (I 964) ("fWJe have often cautioned against the danger, when 
interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents."); 
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ("The fears 
and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of 
legislation."); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203-04 n.24 (1976) 
(quoting Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 66); National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n 
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 680,639 (1967) (quoting Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 
66); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 & n.22 (1956) (quoting 
Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 394-95); S&H Camp Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 519, 521 
( 6th Cir. 194 7) ("[TJhe views of opponents to the enactment of legislation may not 'be 
relied upon as indicative oflegislative intent' .... ") (quoting NLRB v. Thompson Prod., 
Inc., 141 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1944)). 
152. Professor Coffee correctly observes that "the President's characterization of the 
[PSLRA] cannot determine what Congress itself intended." Coffee, supra note 28, at 
982. 
153. The Conference Committee Report or "Conference Report" contains the text 
of the statute that emerges from the Conference Committee and that, if enacted, is the 
law. The Statement of the Managers is a commentary by the conferees that accompanies 
the Conference Committee Report. 
154. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Lit., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 11-12 
(N.D. Cal. Sep 25, 1996). 
155. President's Message to House of Representatives Returning Without Approval 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210 
(Dec. I 9, 1995). 
156. 141 CONG. REC. S19146-54, S19180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1996). 
157. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12. 
158. Id. at 12-13, 16. 
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Judge Smith expressly rejected the contrary holding of Marksman 
Partners, 159 in which Judge Rea had carefully reviewed the statutory 
text and its legislative history to conclude that section 21D(b)(2) did not 
eliminate liability for reckless misconduct. 160 Judge Rea was, more-
over, "unimpressed with defendants' enthusiastic reliance on an oblique 
reference to 'motive, opportunity and recklessness' in a footnote in the 
Conference Committee Report for their argument that the 'motive and 
opportunity' test has been jettisoned."161 
In Silicon Graphics, however, Judge Smith placed great emphasis on 
the fact that the Conference Committee chose not to include in section 
21D(b)(2) language offered by Senator Specter in an amendment which 
would have expressly "allowed a plaintiff to use allegations of reckless-
ness or motive and opportunity to establish fraudulent intent,"162 for 
"[t]he Conference Committee eliminated this amendment from its version 
of the bill."163 Judge Smith concluded: 
Because Congress chose not to include that language from the Second Circuit 
standard relating to motive, opportunity, and recklessness, Congress must have 
adopted the Conference Committee view . . . . The Court therefore holds that 
plaintiff must allege specific facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of 
conscious behavior by defendants. 164 
Thus, in order to state a private securities claim, plaintiff must now allege 
false or misleading statements, describe how the statements are false or 
misleading, and create a strong inference of knowing misrepresentation on the 
part of the defendants. This standard applies whether the statements in question 
are forward-looking or not.'" 
Judge Smith wrote that "[t]he Conference Committee's deletion of the 
Second Circuit standard from the final bill 'strongly militates against a 
judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to 
enact. "'166 Yet the "strong inference" standard in the statute is drawn 
from the Second Circuit precedents. 167 The Statement of the Managers 
159. 927 F. Supp. at 1308-12; see Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 13 n.4. 
160. Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 
n.9 (C.D. Cal 1996). 
161. ld.at131I. 
162. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12. 
163. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 12. 
164. Id. at 12-13. 
165. Id. at 16. 
166. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 13 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp. Paving Co., 
419 U.S. 186,200 (1974)). 
167. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
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says that section 2 lD(b )(2)'s pleading standard "is based in part on the 
pleading standard of the Second Circuit" regarding allegations of 
scienter, but "also is specifically written to conform the language to Rule 
9(b )'s notion of pleading with 'particularity. "'168 "Regarded as the 
most stringent pleading standard," the Managers explained, "the Second 
Circuit require[ s] that the plaintiff state facts with particularity, and that 
these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the 
defendant's fraudulent intent."169 However, they added that "[b Jecause 
the Conference Committee intends to strengthen existing pleading 
requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law 
interpreting this pleading standard."170 An endnote adds that "[t]or this 
reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading 
standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or reckless-
ness." 171 
This does not mean that Congress intended to reject Second Circuit 
case law or to repudiate motive and opportunity or recklessness as ways 
of establishing scienter for most section 1 O(b) actions. The truth is that 
Congress could not simply codify Second Circuit case law on motive, 
opportunity, and recklessness as a universal pleading standard in section 
21D(b)(2) because it also enacted a new Section 21E of the Exchange 
Act to provide a narrow "safe harbor" protecting specified persons from 
liability for certain forward-looking statements, unless those statements 
are made with "actual knowledge of falsity." 172 Since claims within 
section 21E's "safe harbor" require "actual knowledge" rather than 
recklessness, section 21D(b)(2) could not codify case law allowing a 
strong inference of scienter to be raised from allegations of "motive, 
opportunity, or recklessness," as recklessness no longer is the governing 
standard for some section lO(b) claims. Language in Senator Specter's 
proposed amendment of section 21D(b ), which said plaintiffs could raise 
"a strong inference of scienter" with allegations of motive and opportuni-
ty or facts suggesting recklessness, 173 was inconsistent with section 
21E's requirement of actual knowledge for forward-looking state-
ments,174 because it would have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on the 
168. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, 104th Cong. 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 




172. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (1995). 
173. See infra notes 289-310 and accompanying text. 
174. Congress had explicitly rejected recklessness as the standard of liability for a 
Section IO(b) claims based on qualifying forward-looking statements. See supra notes 
166-82 and accompanying text. 
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basis of recklessness in all situations. 175 Not surprisingly, the Confer-
ence Committee deleted it from the bill, inserting language that required 
plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference of the required state of mind," 
which may be actual knowledge in some cases, and recklessness in 
others. 176 
In Silicon Graphics, however, Judge Smith observes that section 
21E(c)(l)(B) "provides that defendants are not liable for forward-looking 
statements accompanied by cautionary language unless the plaintiff 
proves that the statement 'was made with actual knowledge' that it was 
false or misleading, "'177 and extends this narrow, qualified provision 
to all section 1 O(b) claims. But by extending this rule to all section 
JO(b) claims,178 the Silicon Graphics opinion frustrates Congress' 
desire to require actual knowledge only for forward-looking statements. 
Silicon Graphics' holding ignores the fact that early drafts of the 
legislation expressly required actual knowledge of falsity, and were 
rejected because legislators did not want to abolish liability for reckless 
175. Thus, in the veto-override debate, Senator Dodd criticized the Specter 
amendment because it would have included recklessness as a universal standard of 
liability for all section IO(b) claims: "My point simply has been that I do not think the 
Specter amendment was--! think it was an effort to get recklessness in, which would 
have changed the standard ftom the [S]econd [C]ircuit." 141 CONG. REC. Sl9071 (Dec. 
21 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). See infra notes 289-310 and accompanying text. 
Professor Perino observes that section 21D(b)(2)'s "pleading provision applies to other 
private actions under the 1934 Act besides section IO(b)," to argue that "[t]he Specter 
Amendment was thus inconsistent with case law holding that recklessness was 
insufficient to establish liability under these provisions." Perino, supra note 23, at 404. 
We think that section 21 E's requirement of actual knowledge provides for some section 
I O(b) claims is far more compelling. Perino cites as support a vacated opinion's holding 
that "recklessness may not be used to fulfill section 9's scienter requirement." 
Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1165 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated 
460 U.S. 1007 (1983); see Perino, supra note 23, at 404,410 n.61. Perino indicates that 
Chemetron was "vacated on other grounds," but Chemetron 's holding that section 9 
requires more than recklessness appears to us to conflict with section 9's text and with 
precedent holding that reckless conduct satisfies Rule 9(b)'s wilfulness element. See 
Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. 
Supp. 964, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and as a vacated opinion it has no precedential value 
on the required scienter for liability under section 9. See O'Connor v. United States, 422 
U.S. 563, 578 n.2 (1975); Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1424 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1991) ("A decision may be reversed on other grounds, but a decision that has been 
vacated has no precedential authority whatsoever.") (emphasis in original). 
176. See infra at notes 252-59 and accompanying text. 
177. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 16. 
178. See supra notes 129-32. 
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conduct. 179 Congress decided that it would require actual knowledge 
rather than falsity to impose liability for certain narrowly-defined 
forward-looking statements,180 and to impose full joint-and-several 
liablity rather than proportionate-fault liablity. 181 Otherwise, it chose 
not to change the scienter standard. 182 Congress provided that the 
"safe harbor" should apply only to a narrowly-defined group of 
"forward-looking" statements. 183 It carefully limited the "safe harbor," 
providing that it would apply only to forward-looking statements of an 
issuer subject to reporting requirements under section 13(a) or section 
15(d) of the Exchange Act, and to certain persons acting on such an 
issuer's behalf, including outside reviewers retained by such an issuer, 





See supra notes 148-6 I and accompanying text. 
15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (Supp. 1996). 
15 U.S.C. §78u-4(g). 
See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (C.D. Cal. 
1996). 
183. Section 21 E(i) defines "forward-looking statements" that may qualify for the 
safe harbor requiring proof of actual knowledge: 
(i) Definitions--For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall 
apply: 
(I) Forward-looking statement. - The term forward-looking statement 
means-
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including 
income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital 
expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items; 
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future 
operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or 
services of the issuer; 
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such 
statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition 
by the management or in the results of operations included pursuant 
to the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); 
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the 
extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by 
the issuer; or 
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as 
may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commissions. 
15 U.S.C. § 78-u5(i)(l) (Supp. 1996). 
184. Section 2 IE(a) provides: 
924 
(a) Applicability-This section shall apply only to a forward-looking 
statement made by -
(I) an issuer that, at the time that the statement is made, subject to the 
reporting requirements of section 78m(a) or section 78o(d) of this title; 
(2) a person acting on behalf of such issuer; 
(3) an outside reviewer retained by such issuer making a statement on 
behalf of such issuer; or 
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sions from protection of the "safe harbor," exempting many statements 
from section 21E(c)'s actual-knowledge requirement. 185 All of these 
provisions are effectively nullified by Silicon Graphics's apparent 
holding that a similar actual knowledge requirement applies to all section 
(4) an underwriter, with respect to information provided by such issuer or 
information derived from information provided by such issuer. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (Supp. I 996). 
185. Section 21E(b) provides: 
(b) Exclusions. - Except to the extent otherwise specifically provided by rule, 
regulation, or order of the Commission, this section shall not apply to a 
forward-looking statement -
(I) that is made with respect to the business or operations of the issuer, if 
the issuer-
(A) during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the statement 
was first made -
(i) was convicted of any felony or misdemeanor described in clauses 
(i) through (iv) of section 78(b)(4)(B) of this title; or 
(ii) has been made the subject of a judicial or administrative decree or 
order arising out of a goverrunental action that -
(I) prohibits future violations of the antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws; 
(II) requires that the issuer cease and desist from violating the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws; or 
(III) determines that the issuer violated the antifraud provisions of 
the securities laws; 
(B) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with an offering 
of securities by a blank check company; 
(C) issues penny stock; 
(D) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a going 
private transaction; or 
(E) makes the forward-looking statement in connection with a going 
private transaction; or 
(2) that is -
(A) included in a financial statement prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles; 
(B) contained in a registration statement of, or otherwise issued by, an 
investment company; 
(C) made in connection with a tender offer; 
(D) made in connection with an initial public offering; 
(E) made in connection with an offering by, or relating to the opera-
tions of, a partnership, limited liability company, or a direct 
participation investment program; or 
(F) made in a disclosure of beneficial ownership in a report required to 
be filed with the Commission pursuant to section 13( d). 
15 U.S.C. §78u-5(b) (Supp. 1996). 
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lO(b) claims, without regard to whether they come within the section 
21E's "safe harbor."186 
Acknowledging that Congress also distinguished between knowing and 
non-knowing violations with section 21D(g)(2)'s provision limitingjoint-
and-several liability, Judge Smith brushed it away with the assertion that 
"Congress was making the distinction between knowing violators under 
section 21D of the [PSLRA] and non-knowing control persons under 
section 78t of the original Act, for example."187 But section 21D says 
nothing about "knowing violators;" it speaks only of"the required state 
of mind," to be supplied by reference to other sections of the statute and 
the case law interpreting them. 
In the end, Judge Smith tried to justify her holding on the ground that 
"courts should be mindful of ... policy considerations in construing 
federal securities law."188 But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that policy considerations cannot override the securities laws' text. 189 
No doubt, "Congress sought to 'protect investors, issuers, and all who 
are associated with our capital markets from abusive securities litiga-
tion. "'190 But neither the statute nor its legislative history indicates 
that assertion of claims based on reckless misstatements or omissions is 
"abusive" litigation. Quite to the contrary, when the SEC and others 
objected that provisions in early drafts of the legislation would eliminate 
liability for reckless misrepresentation, Congress eliminated them. 191 
Thus, even if one could argue that some of the policy considerations 
underlying the PSLRA might support a higher scienter standard for all 
section 1 O(b) claims, that would provide no ground for ignoring statutory 
186. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C96-0393FMS, slip op. at 16 
(N.0. Cal. Sep. 25, 1996) ("This standard applies whether the statements in question are 
forward-looking or not."). 
187. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15. 
188. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15-16. 
189. See. e.g., CentralBankv. First Interstate Bank, 114S.Ct. 1439, 1453-54(1994) 
("Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the 
Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text and 
structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it.") 
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 
622,654 (1988) ("we need not entertain Pinter's policy arguments"); Aaron v. SEC, 446 
U.S. 680, 696 (1980) (policy considerations under the securities laws "will not justify 
reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably 
permit"') (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,578 (1979) (quoting 
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978))); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
214 n.33 (1976) (finding "no occasion to examine the additional considerations of 
'policy' ... that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute"). 
190. Silicon Graphics, slip op. at 15 (quoting Statement of the Managers, H. CoNF. 
REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 731). 
191. See infra notes 329-35 and accompanying text. 
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language that clearly embraces existing legal standards. 192 Moreover, 
the fundamental stated policy underlying the PSLRA, according to the 
Statement of the Managers, was to ensure effective enforcement of 
investors' rights, not to frustrate investors' claims by abolishing all 
liability based on reckless violations of section lO(b). 193 
Far from supporting Silicon Graphics, a careful review of the 
legislative history of section 21D(b)(2) actually confirms that Congress 
adopted the Second Circuit's "strong inference" pleading standard and 
that it intended for courts to seek guidance from Second Circuit 
precedents on how a "strong inference" of scienter may be pleaded. The 
bill's proponents unquestionably intended to preserve motive, opportuni-
ty, and recklessness as means of establishing scienter. 194 
192. See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 296-98 (1970). In Sisson, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the statutory phrase "decision arresting a judgment" in light 
of the contemporary legal context at the time of its enactment, rejecting the dissent's 
contention that the "broad policy" under the act mandated a different interpretation: 
Id. 
Radical reinterpretations of the statutory phrase "decision arresting a 
judgment" are said to be necessary in order to effectuate a broad policy, found 
to be underlying the Criminal Appeals Act, that this Court review important 
legal issues. The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language 
that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides 
us when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of a statute are 
subsumed by the underlying policies to which Congress was committed. Care 
must be taken, however, to respect the limits up to which Congress was 
prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a 
statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing pressures 
of other policies. 
l 93. According to the Statement of the Managers: 
The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect investors 
and to maintain confidence in the securities markets, so that our national 
savings, capital formation and investment may grow for the benefit of all 
Americans. 
The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of 
American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who 
seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and meritless suits. Private 
securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors 
can recover their losses without having to rely on government action. Such 
private lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets 
and help to deter wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, 
directors, lawyers and other properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks 
to return the securities litigation system to that high standard. 
Statement of the Managers, H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-469, at 31, reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 730. 
194. See infra notes 295-309 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Legislative History of Section 21D(b)(2) 
1. The Second Circuit "Strong inference" Standard and the 
Conflict Among the Circuits 
The legislative history of section 21D(b) must begin with the split 
among the circuits regarding the Second Circuit's "strong inference" 
pleading standard. Describing the Second Circuit's Ross decision as 
"contra," the First Circuit in McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Jnc., 195 
chose to follow "[t]he clear weight of authority ... that Rule 9[(b)] 
requires specification of the time, place, and content of an alleged false 
representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from which 
fraudulent intent could be inferred."1% Many courts followed the First 
Circuit and McGinty in rejecting Second Circuit law on this point. 197 
However, in 1992, with the decision of Greenstone v. Cambex, 198 the 
First Circuit departed from the rule it set down in McGinty, without so 
much as citing that decision, to state that "[t]he courts have uniformly 
held inadequate a complaint's general averment of the defendant's 
'knowledge' of material falsity, unless the complaint also sets forth 
specific facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that 
a statement was materially false or misleading."199 The court affirmed 
dismissal of a complaint on the ground that "[t]he inferential links are 
weak."200 
In 1993, a three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit followed Second 
Circuit decisions, holding that "[a]lthough Rule 9(b) allows scienter to 
be pleaded generally, courts have required that the facts pied provide a 
195. 633 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1980). 
196. Id. at 228. 
197. E.g., Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 
I 989) (rejecting Second Circuit decisions requiring the pleading of "facts that create a 
'strong inference"' of scienter because they cannot be reconciled with the "plain 
language" of Rule 9(b)); New Hebron Public School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum, 690 F. Supp. 
866, 871 (D. N.D. 1988); Caliber Partners, Ltd. v. Affeld, 583 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (rejecting "the solitary viewpoint" of the Second Circuit in Ross, in 
favor of "the 'clear weight of authority' as exemplified by McGinty"); SEC v. Tiffany 
Industries, Inc., 535 F. Supp. I 160, 1166 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("Rule 9(b) does not require 
any particularity with respect to an averment of intent or knowledge."); Hokama v. E.F. 
Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting Second Circuit case 
law as contrary to the text of Rule 9(b) and noting that "[ o ]ther circuits have also 
rejected Ross and interpreted Rule 9(b) to mean what it says."). 
198. 975 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1992). 
199. Id. at 25. 
200. Id. at 27. 
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basis for a strong inference of fraudulent intent."201 "The real inqui-
ry," the court wrote, "must be whether the facts in the amended 
complaint would give rise to an inference that the Defendants either did 
not believe the statements or knew that the statements were false."202 
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing and convened en bane, then issued 
an opinion vacating the panel opinion and rejecting Second Circuit law 
as "irreconcilable with the second sentence of Rule 9(b)."203 To 
demand any inference of scienter would "conflict[] both with the English 
rule which was the model for Rule 9(b) and with the second sentence of 
Rule 9(b) itself, which declares unequivocally that state of mind may be 
averred generally, and says absolutely nothing about required inferenc-
es."204 Nonetheless, the GlenFed court imposed requirements for 
pleading falsity that may be more demanding than some Second Circuit 
decisions. 205 
GlenFed placed the Ninth Circuit in direct conflict with the Second 
Circuit, while decisions in the First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits appeared 
to join the Second Circuit in requiring allegations to raise an inference 
of scienter.206 Decisions from other courts adhered to the rule stated 
by the en bane panel in GlenFed.207 
In the summer of 1994, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before 
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House of 
Representatives Committee on Energy and Finance that "there is a split 
in the circuits regarding the application of Rule 9(b) in securities fraud 
201. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 843, 848 (citing O'Brien v. Nat'l 
Property Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991). 
Id. 
202. Id. at 849. 
203. In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994). 
204. Id. at 1546. The Ninth Circuit explained: 
We are not permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we 
like the effects of doing so. This is a job for Congress, or for the various 
legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending 
the Federal Rules. 
205. See supra notes 82-108 and accompanying text. 
206. See Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992); Tuchman 
v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst & 
Young, 901 F.2d 624,629 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990). 
207. See, e.g., In re Valuevision International Sec. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 434, 446-47 
(E.D. Pa. 1995). 
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cases."208 Chairman Levitt observed that "[a]lthough the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b) does not apply by its terms to allegations 
regarding a defendants' state of mind, some courts nevertheless require 
that plaintiffs plead with some particularity the facts suggesting that a 
defendant had the requisite scienter."209 He testified that "the First, 
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all started to require a similar 
'inference' in cases involving scienter, but that other circuits continue to 
apply the more liberal standard."210 Chairman Levitt told Congress 
that "[i]t would be beneficial to harmonize the differing standards 
applied by the circuit courts of appeal on this issue, either under the 
auspices of the Judicial Conference of the United States or through 
legislation," after "a careful evaluation of the experience with the Second 
Circuit's approach."211 
2. The Legislative Response 
Congress acted to resolve the conflict among the circuits on the 
requirements for pleading securities fraud, ultimately adopting the Ninth 
Circuit approach to pleading falsity with particularity and the Second 
Circuit approach to pleading scienter. Further, after first considering 
revisions that might abolish liability for recklessness, Congress decided 
to eliminate recklessness liability only for certain forward-looking 
statements. 
a. Congressional Hearings and Early Drafts 
Culminating in Passage of HR. 1058 
In early 1995, the bills proposed to address securities litigation matters 
did not incorporate the Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard. 
Proposals that would have eliminated liability for reckless misconduct 
were considered, but after drawing a hostile response from the SEC, 
were quickly abandoned. 
As introduced on January 4, 1995,212 Title II of H.R. 10 provided for 
changes to the federal securities laws and included new provisions 
regarding both the state of mind required to establish liability, and the 
208. Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before The Subcomm. On Telecommuni-
cations And Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 37-38 (1994) (July 22, 1994) (statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
209. Id. at 38. 
210. Id. 
21 I. Id. 
212. See 141 CONG. REC. H124 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995). 
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rules for pleading that state of mind.213 It would have added a new 
section lOA(a) to the Exchange Act, apparently abolishing monetary 
liability for reckless misconduct by requiring proof that a "defendant 
knew [a] statement was misleading at the time it was made, or intention-
ally omitted to state a fact knowing that such omission would render 
misleading the statements made at the time they were made."214 It 
213. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., !st Sess. § 204 (1995), would have added a new section 
I 0A which would have provided: 
Id. 
SEC. JOA. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS. 
(a) SCIENTER. - In any action under section IO(b), a defendant may be 
held liable for money damages only on proof -
(I) that the defendant made an untrue statement of a material fact, or 
omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were 
made, not misleading; and 
(2) that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at the time 
it was made, or intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing that 
such omission would render misleading the statements made at the 
time they were made. 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF 
SCIENTER. - In any action under section I 0(b) in which it is alleged 
that the defendant -
(I) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or 
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they 
were made, not misleading; the complaint shall allege specific facts 
demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time the 
alleged violation occurred. The complaint shall also specify each 
statement or omission alleged to have been misleading and the 
reasons the statement or omission is misleading. If an allegation 
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information 
on which that belief is formed. Failure to comply fully with this 
requirement shall result in dismissal of the complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action. 
214. Id. By imposing liability only for "an untrue statement of a material fact, or 
omi[ ssion] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading," the new section 
I 0A would have effectively eliminated liability for violations of Rule I 0b-5( I) and I 0b-
5(2), which make it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or 
"to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security." 17 C.F.R. § 240. I 0b-5(a), (c). This would have effectively limited liability 
under section I 0(b) to violations of Rule !Ob-5(2), which makes it unlawful "to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
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also would have added a new Section IOA(b), requiring a section IO(b) 
complaint to "allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of 
each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."215 The bill 
was referred to the House Committee on Commerce, and the Committee 
on the Judiciary.216 The Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and Finance then held hearings in January and 
February of 1995.217 
As introduced by Senator Domenici on January 18, 1995,218 S. 240 
would have added a new section 39 to the Exchange Act, providing: 
In an implied action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may recover 
money damages from a defendant only on proof that the defendant acted with 
some level of intent, the plaintiff's complaint shall allege specific facts 
demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged 
violation occurred.219 
were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 10b-5(b). Ultimately, Congress chose not to 
enact language overruling the many decisions that have recognized liability under section 
I O(b) for a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or for conduct that "operates as a 
fraud or deceit." E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (noting 
that section IO(b)'s phrase prohibiting "any manipulative device or contrivance" by 
definition includes schemes to defraud) (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY ( 1934)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150, 152-53 
(1972) (noting that although "the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making 
of an untrue statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact," 
nonetheless "[t]he first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted ... " and impose 
liability for defendants' conduct which fall "within the very language of one or the other 
of those subparagraphs, a 'course of business' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that 
operated as a fraud"); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,903 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Rule 
I Ob-5 liability is not restricted solely to isolated misrepresentations or omissions; it may 
also be predicated on a 'practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud 
... '"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891 (I 976); Competitive Associates, Inc. v. Laventhol, 
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811,814 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Not every violation 
of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities law can be, or should be, forced into 
a category headed 'misrepresentations' or 'nondisclosures.' Fraudulent devices, 
practices, schemes, artifices and courses of business are also interdicted by the securities 
laws."); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 967-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994) 
(reviewing principles and precedents dealing with "scheme to defraud" liability); In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Products Business Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 467-69 
(S.D.N.Y. I 987). 
215. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 204 (1995). 
2 I 6. 141 CONG. REC. HI 24 ( daily ed. Jan. 4, I 995). 
217. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the 
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
218. 141 CONG. REC. S1070, Sl075-84 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995). 
219. S. 240, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1995) (emphasis added). The new 
section 39 would have provided: 
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SEC. 39. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
(a) INTENT. - In an implied private action arising under this title in 
which the plaintiff may recover money damages from a defendant only 
on proof that the defendant acted with some level of intent, the 
plaintiffs complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state 
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It also would have required plaintiffs asserting claims under Rule lOb-
5(2) to "specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation 
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, 
the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is 
formed."220 S. 240 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs.221 Its Subcommittee on Securities held 
hearings on the bill in March and April of 1995.222 
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt condemned H.R. 10 in his February 10, 
1995 testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and 
Finance of the House Committee on Commerce.223 He warned that 
our capital markets "could be seriously harmed by overzealous 
legislation," because "private rights of action are fundamental to the 
success of those markets."224 Among the SEC's objections to H.R. 10 
was the issue of sci enter. 225 
The SEC was "against any proposal to require a plaintiff to prove that 
the defendant had actual knowledge" that statements were false. 226 
Liability for reckless misconduct was "needed to protect the integrity of 
Id. 
of mind of each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred. 
(b) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS. - In an implied 
action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant-
( 1) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or 
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they 
were made, not misleading; the plaintiff shall specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons 
why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the 
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the 
plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is 
formed. 
220. Id. 
221. 141 CONG. REC. SI070 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995). 
222. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1995). 
223. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the 
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-221 (1995). 
224. Id. at I 93. 
225. Id. at 194. 
226. Id. 
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the disclosure process which . . . represents the integrity of the 
markets."227 Chairman Levitt explained:228 
We really want corporations----we want executives of corporations------to worry 
about the accuracy of their disclosures. It is the best way I know to assure the 
markets of a continuous stream of reliable, accurate information. Any higher 
scienter standard threatens the process that has made our markets what they are. 
Indeed, an actual knowledge standard could create a legal incentive to ignore 
indications of fraud. The phrase, "Ignorance is bliss," could take on, unhappily, 
new meaning. 
Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks underscored the SEC's objections 
to eliminating liability for reckless misconduct.229 By "requiring proof 
that the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally," H.R. 10 signalled 
"a retreat from the recklessness standard [that] would greatly erode the 
deterrent effect of private actions."23° Chairman Levitt explained: 
The Commission has consistently supported a recklessness standard because 
such a standard is needed to protect the integrity of the disclosure process. The 
law should sanction corporations and individuals who act recklessly when 
making disclosures, because that is the only way to assure the markets of a 
continuous stream of accurate information. Any higher scienter standard would 
lessen the incentives for corporations and other issuers to conduct a full inquiry 
into areas of potential exposure, and thus threaten the process that has made our 
markets a model for nations around the world. 
Moreover, because an actual knowledge standard would virtually foreclose 
recovery against attorneys, accountants, and financial advisers, it would reduce 
the degree to which such professional advisers encourage full and complete 
disclosure.'3 1 
Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks also indicated that "[t]he 
Commission believes that it would be beneficial to resolve the split 
between the circuits regarding the proper application of Rule (9b)."232 
Chairman Levitt noted that the Second Circuit "has long required that 
plaintiffs pleading securities fraud alleged facts giving rise to a 'strong 
inference' of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants,"233 and 
other courts had recently "started to require a similar 'inference of 
scienter.'"234 But H.R. 10 demanded too much. It would "require 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 194-95. 
229. Id. at 201-02. 
230. Id. at 202. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 199 ( emphasis added). 
233. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980)). 
234. Id. (citing Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992); 
Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); Di Leo 
v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990). 
Chairman Levitt noted that other courts of appeal had rejected this approach on the 
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plaintiffs to plead specific facts 'demonstrating' the state of mind of each 
defendant-a test which arguably is more severe than that employed in 
any of the circuits today."235 Chairman Levitt noted that many 
plaintiffs would not be able to demonstrate a defendant's state of mind 
without having the chance to conduct discovery.236 
On February 14, 1995, after hearings on H.R. 10, the Subcommittee 
on Telecommunications and Finance approved an amendment to Title II 
of H.R. IO in the form of a substitute, and it then ordered the bill as 
amended reported to the full Committee.237 The substitute's provision 
took a step toward restoring liability for reckless misconduct.238 Its 
ground that it goes beyond the language of Rule 9(b). Id. (citing In re GlenFed, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 
F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); Auslender v. Energy Management Corp., 832 F.2d 
354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. Specifically, Mr. Levitt stated: "It is likely that there would be many cases 
in which plaintiffs with meritorious claims would be unable to make such a demonstra-
tion without an opportunity to conduct discovery." Id. 
237. 141 CONG. REC. D191 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995) (daily digest). 
238. It did so with a convoluted and confusing text that appeared to require 
plaintiffs to prove that fraud was both intentional and reckless. H.R. 10, Committee 
Print Showing the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to Title II of H.R. 10 
Adopted By the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. (Feb. 14, 1995). 
The new Section 204 of H.R. 10 called for adding a new Section 1 0A(a) to the 
Exchange Act, providing: 
(a) SCIENTER. -
(1) IN GENERAL. - In any private action arising under this title based on 
a misstatement or omission of a material fact, liability may not be 
established unless the defendant possessed the intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud. The defendant may be found to have acted with 
such intent only on proof that -
(A) the defendant directly or indirectly made a fraudulent statement; 
(B) the defendant possessed the intention to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud; and 
(C) the defendant made such fraudulent statement knowingly or 
recklessly. 
(2) FRAUDULENT STATEMENT. - For purposes of paragraph (I), a 
fraudulent statement is a statement that contains an untrue statement of 
a material fact, or omits a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were 
made, not misleading. 
(3) KNOWINGLY. -For purposes of paragraph(]), a defendant makes 
a fraudulent statement knowingly if the defendant knew that the 
statement of a material fact was misleading at the time it was made, or 
knew that an omitted fact was necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not 
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prov1s10n on pleading scienter required plaintiffs to "make specific 
allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to 
each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred."239 
The SEC responded swiftly with a press release on February 15, 1995, 
expressing concern regarding the amended bill's provisions--including 
the "pleading requirements, [ and] the standard to establish reckless 
conduct"---concluding that "[b ]ecause of the potential impact on U.S. 
investors and markets, the Commission cannot support the proposed 
provisions."24° Chairman Levitt sent a letter to Representative Bliley 
explaining that the SEC opposed the amended bill's provisions, including 
those on "the standard to establish recklessness, [and] the pleading 
requirements," because "these provisions would adversely affect the 
interests of U.S. investors."241 Chairman Levitt assured Representative 
Bliley that the SEC supported his "effort to craft balanced legislation," 
but warned that "the proposed language approved yesterday does not 
achieve the balance we would seek."242 
The next day, the subcommittee agreed to an amendment submitted 
by Representative Cox, which further refined the statutory definition of 
misleading. 
(4) RECKLESSNESS. -For purposes of paragraph(!), a defendant makes 
a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such 
statement, acted with willful blindness such that the defendant was 
consciously aware of a high probability that the statement was false, and 
took deliberate actions in order to avoid ascertaining its truth or falsity. 
A defendant who actually believed the statement was true is not 
reckless. 
H.R. JO, Committee Print§ 204 (Feb. 14, 1995) (emphasis added). 
239. H.R. 10., Committee Print §204 (Feb. 14, 1995) (emphasis added). The 
substitute' s provision on pleading scienter provided for a new Securities Exchange Act 
section IOA(b ): 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR EXPLICIT PLEADING AND PROOF OF 
SCIENTER. - In any private action to which subsection (a) applies, the 
complaint shall specify each statement or omission alleged to have hen 
misleading, and the reasons the statement or omission is misleading. The 
complaint shall also make specific allegations which, if true, would be 
sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time the alleged 
violation occurred. It shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the 
mere presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged 
to have been misleading. If an allegation is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall set forth with specificity all information on 
which that belief is formed. 
H.R. JO, Committee Print §204 (Feb. 14, 1995). 
240. Statement by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding H.R. 
JO as Amended On February 14, Securities and Exchange Commission News Release 
(Feb. 15, 1995). 
241. Letter from SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr., to Rep. Thomas Bliley, 
Chairman, Committee on Commerce (Feb. 15, 1995) (on file with authors). 
242. Id. 
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recklessness.243 This definition paralleled the Sundstrand standard 
adopted by the federal courts and endorsed by the SEC.244 The SEC 
responded, stating that "the current version of R.R. l O represents an 
improvement over the bill as originally introduced," in part because it 
now expressly "preserved liability based on reckless conduct."245 Still, 
the SEC objected that the text might inadvertently extend scienter 
requirements to section 14 and section 18 claims, which required no 
showing of scienter,246 and it recommended revising the definition of 
recklessness to more closely conform to the Sundstrand formulation. 247 
243. Representative Cox's amendment revised subsection (4) to read: 
(4) RECKLESSNESS. - For purposes of paragraph (1), a defendant makes 
a fraudulent statement recklessly if the defendant, in making such 
statement, is guilty of highly unreasonable conduct that (A) involves not 
merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from 
standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger of misleading buyers 
or sellers that was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the 
defendant must have been consciously aware of it. For example, a 
defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose, or to whom disclosure did not 
come to mind, is not reckless. 
Amendment to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (Feb. 16, 1995) (copy on 
file with the authors). This provision deviated from the Sundstrand standard itself in two 
respects. First, the word "consciously" does not appear in Sundstrand. Second, the final 
sentence, giving an example of conduct that would not be reckless, is completely new. 
244. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
245. H.R. REP. No. 104-50, 104th Cong. (1995), reprinted in 120 C.I.S. H273-2, 
42. 
246. Id. at 43. The SEC objected that the text "would have the effect of requiring 
a showing of scienter in proxy cases brought under Section 14 of the Exchange Act and 
disclosure cases brought under Section 18, neither of which currently has a scienter 
requirement, in addition to cases under Section I0(b)." Id. 
247. Id. at 43-44. The SEC explained: 
Subsection I0A(a) would provide that liability in a private action may be 
based on conduct that satisfies a definition of recklessness based generally on 
the standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Sun[d]strand Corporation v. Sun Chemical Corporation. 
The Sun[d]strand definition has been altered by adding the word "conscious-
ly" near the end of the first sentence, and by adding the second sentence, 
which paraphrases a footnote in the Sun[d}strand opinion. The extent to 
which these amendments would change the result in any particular case is 
unclear, but the Commission believes that it would be preferable simply to 
codify the Sun[d]strand definition as currently applied by a majority of the 
federal circuit courts. 
Id. The SEC also recommended "that the second part of the three part test in Subsection 
I 0A(a) be deleted as redundant, as a defendant's intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud 
is established by evidence that the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a fraudulent 
statement." Id. 
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The SEC also objected to the provision on pleading scienter: 
For purposes of pleading scienter, subsection (b) of new Section IOA would 
require a plaintiff to make specific allegations which, if true, would be 
sufficient to "establish" that the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly. It 
then adds that "it shall not be sufficient for this purpose to plead the mere 
presence of facts inconsistent with a statement or omission alleged to have been 
misleading." 
As the Commission noted in its testimony, it would be beneficial to resolve 
the existing split between the circuit courts regarding pleading requirements 
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the Commission's 
view, however, the standard in H.R. IO would place unrealistic demands on 
plaintiffs. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals currently requires that plaintiffs 
plead with some particularity facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of 
fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. This test is regarded as being the 
most stringent used today, and the Commission recommends that Congress not 
enact anv pleading requirements that go beyond those used by the Second 
Circuit.2411 
The SEC's objections and suggestions were included in the Commerce 
Committee's report on the bill.249 The committee report explained that 
its restatement of the Sundstrand standard, "particularly as it has been 
applied in the case law of the Second and Seventh Circuits, will provide 
the degree of consistency and certainty,"250 but that "[i]n adopting a 
standard that includes language from the Sundstrand case . . . the 
Committee notes that it in no way intends to codify all of the prior case 
/aw-indeed, any particular case-purporting to apply that deci-
sion."251 As to pleading scienter, the Committee explained that the bill 
would require a plaintiff to "specify each statement or omission alleged 
to have been misleading and must make specific allegations which, if 
true, would be sufficient to establish that the defendant acted knowingly 
or recklessly. "252 
The text of Title II of H.R. 10, as amended and reported by the 
Commerce Committee, was introduced by Representative Bliley on 
February 27, 1995, as a new bill, H.R. 1058.253 The bill was consid-
ered and amended by the House on March 7 and 8, 1995, conforming 









Id. at 44. 
H.R. REP. No. 104-50, 104th Cong., 42-46 (1995). 
Id. at 39. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
141 CONG. REc. H2306 ( daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995); H.R. I 058, I 04th Cong. 
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dard.254 The House of Representatives clearly intended to preserve 
recklessness as a basis of liability. 
It did not intend to require proof of scienter in a complaint. On the 
floor of the House, Representative Cox defended H.R. 1058's require-
ment that a complaint must "make specific allegations which, if true, 
would be sufficient to establish scienter as to each defendant at the time 
the alleged violation occurred. "255 He declared that this phrase was 
not intended to require proof of scienter in the complaint: 
First of all, we are talking today about allegations, so we do not need to know 
that they are true. You simply allege it and you get on with your lawsuit, you 
go through discovery, you take depositions, you subpoena records, and so on, 
and see if you can back up those allegations. But you make the allegations in 
your complaint; you do not put the proof in your complaint. 
Second, you can do it on information and belief, so you just state in your 
pleading that the plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that--and that is very, very easy to do. The complaint shall make allegations 
which, if true, would be sufficient to establish Scienter. 
So for purposes of judging the pleading, all the court does is assume all of 
the allegations are true even before you have actually proved them, and if added 
together, assuming their truthfulness, they would state a cause of action and you 
get by judgment on the pleadings, and awa1, you go and you are off with your 
lawsuit. That is the way it ought to work. " 
Representative Cox defended his bill's language against a proposed 
amendment offered by Representative Bryant, explaining that: 
254. 141 CONG. REC. H2749-H2780 (daily ed. March 7, 1995), 141 CONG. REC. 
H2818-H2864 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). Representative Fields offered an amendment 
of technical and conforming changes that, among other things, struck the word 
"consciously" from the definition of recklessness. Id. at H2779. Representative Fields's 
amendment also narrowed the scope of the scienter requirement, so that it would apply 
only to actions under section I O(b ), and not to actions under section 14 or Section I 8. 
Id. The amendment was agreed to without dissent on March 7. Id. 
On March 8, Representative Eshoo offered an amendment that would strike the 
following words: "For example, a defendant who genuinely forgot to disclose or to 
whom disclosure did not come to mind is not reckless." 141 CONG. REC. H28!8 (daily 
ed. March 8, 1995). Representative Eshoo explained that Congress should delete the 
"sentence which allows the defendant to escape liability" for reckless fraud, by saying 
"I forgot to tell the truth." Id. Representative Cox agreed that the objectionable sentence 
might be removed, but his substitute inserted the following language in its place: 
"Deliberately refraining from taking steps to discover whether one's statements are false 
or misleading constitutes recklessness, but if the failure to investigate was not deliberate, 
such conduct shall not be considered to be recklessness." Id. at H2820. The amendment 
offered by Representative Cox as a substitute for the amendment offered by Representa-
tive Eshoo was agreed to by a roll call vote. Id. at H2826. 
255. H.R. 1058 § 4, 104th Cong. (1995). 
256. 141 CONG. REC. H2836 (daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
939 
[W]e are not asking anyone do anything other than allege. We are asking 
people to make an allegation. That is[,] they can charge something. They do 
not have to prove it until later."' 
And he contrasted the House bill with what he believed to be the more 
demanding alternative text of S. 240, which would require plaintiffs to 
"allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defen-
dant,"258 explaining that the House bill required less than this. With 
these assurances from the bill's leading proponent, H.R. 1058 passed the 
House on a vote of 325 to 99.259 
b. The Pleading Standard in Senate Hearings 
The House bill was received by the Senate and referred to the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.260 Its Subcom-
mittee on Securities held hearings on H.R. 1058 and on S. 240 in March 
and April of 1995.261 
On April 6, 1995, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. testified before 
the subcommittee,262 calling S. 240 "a positive step," but urging 
Congress to revise the legislation's provisions relating to state of 
mind.263 He again asked Congress "to work together to make certain 
257. 141 CONG. REC. H2850 (daily ed. March 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
258. Id. The Dodd-Domenici proposal is as follows: 
The complaint shall allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of 
each defendant. 
Rep. Cox explained that: 
[W]e had a lot of complaints about that language on our side because 
people said, "Well, you would have to be a mind reader in order to 
demonstrate the state of mind of each defendant." So now our bill no 
longer says that. It says that the complaint shall specify each statement 
or omission alleged to have been misleading. Those are objective facts 
and the reasons that the statement or omission was misleading. That is 
factual as well, and of course one only has to allege it. 
The complaint shall also make specific allegations which, if true, would 
be sufficient to establish scienter. So one only has to allege things which, 
if true, if they were proved later, would add up to a case that meets all the 
requirements of the existing law. 
141 CONG. REC. H2850 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). 
259. 141 CONG. REC. H2863-64 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). 
260. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S. 240, S. 667 and H.R. 1058: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 104-57 (1995) [hereinafter Securities Litigation Reform 
Proposals]. 
261. Id. The subcommittee held hearings on March 2, March 22, and April 6, 1995. 
Id. 
262. Id. at 228-36, 247-57 (opening and prepared statements of Arthur Levitt and 
colloquy). 
263. Id. at 230. 
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improvements in the bill, including the adoption of the Second Circuit's 
pleading requirement that plaintiffs plead with particularity ... facts that 
give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent by the defendant."264 
When asked about his primary concerns with the proposed legislation, 
Chairman Levitt reiterated that "the standards for pleading a defendant's 
state of mind should be conformed to the Second Circuit standard . 
"
265 He urged the senators to use the Sundstrand standard of 
recklessness, to "avoid the kind of confusion that would result from the 
present wording."266 "Those two areas," he testified, "are probably the 
most important. "267 
Chairman Levitt's prepared remarks similarly urged the adoption of 
the Second Circuit's pleading requirement, that plaintiffs plead with 
particularity facts ~iving rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent 
by the defendant.2 8 Chairman Levitt explained: 
[T]here is a split between the circuit courts regarding the manner in which Rule 
9(b) should be interpreted. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals requires that 
a plaintiff pleading securities fraud allege facts that give rise to a "strong 
inference" of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant. 269 This require-
ment may be satisfied either by alleging facts that establish a motive to commit 
fraud and an opportunity to do so, or by alleging facts that constitute 
circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior270• • • • Other 
courts of appeal, however, including most recently the Ninth Circuit, have 
rejected this approach on the grounds that it goes beyond the plain language of 
Rule 9(b).271 
He further observed: 
The pleading provision in the House bill would require a plaintiff "to make 
specific allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as 
264. Id.; see also id. at 235-36 ("I think this notion of state of mind is so vague and 
open to so many different interpretations, that I really believe that we should conform 
to the Second Circuit standard that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts that give rise 
to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. And I think by codifying that, we accomplish 
pretty much what we intend to accomplish with respect to pleadings."). 
265. Id. at 231. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 24 7. 
269. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 946 (1980); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d at 268. 
270. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d at 268-69. 
271. In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d, 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994); Phelps v. 
Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989); Auslender v. Energy 
Management Corp., 832 F.2d 354, 356 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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to each defendant." Unless facts giving rise to "a strong inference" of scienter 
are viewed as sufficient to "establish" scienter, this test is more stringent than 
even the standards currently imposed by the Second Circuit. The pleading 
requirement proposed in the Domenici-Dodd bill would require a plaintiff to 
"allege specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant." This 
test may be less onerous than that provided in the House bill, but the use of the 
word "demonstrating" may still create a standard more stringent than the 
Second Circuit standard.272 
Chairman Levitt then recommended "that the language be amended to 
conform with the language actually used by the Second Circuit, which 
has been clarified and refined by the case law and is therefore less likely 
to generate additional litigation."273 
Chairman Levitt warned that "it is unrealistic to expect a plaintiff, at 
the commencement of an action, to be able to present facts specifically 
demonstrating that a defendant acted with the requisite state of 
mind."274 "Indeed, in most cases it may be impossible at the pleading 
stage, before any discovery has been taken, to meet such a burden."275 
Chairman Levitt was concerned with any provision that: 
"(I]t shall not be sufficient ... to plead the mere presence of facts inconsistent 
with a statement or omission alleged to have been misleading." The contempo-
raneous existence of facts inconsistent with a defendant's statement is the type 
of evidence often relied upon by a plaintiff to establish an inference of sci enter. 
Indeed, it may be the only evidence available to a plaintiff prior to discov-
ery.'" 
To resolve the split between the circuits regarding the proper 
application of Rule 9(b), the Commission recommended that Congress 
obtain input from the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States prior to enacting any legislation.277 
The Commission further recommended "that Congress not enact any 
pleading requirements that go beyond those used by the Second Circuit, 
which are regarded as being the most stringent used today."278 
c. The "Strong Inference" Provision Enters S. 240's Text 
The Second Circuit's "strong inference" standard was added by the 
Senate Banking Committee in order to bring the nation's other courts 
272. Securities Litigation Reform Proposals, at 249. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 248. 
275. Id. at 248. 
276. Id. at 249 n.9. 
277. Id. at 249. 
278. Id. 
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into line with the Second Circuit precedents on pleading scienter. The 
committee report explained: 
The courts of appeals have interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways, creating 
distinctly different pleading standards among the circuits. 
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that 
would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform 
standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded 
as the most stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the 
plaintiff plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's 
fraudulent intent. The Committee does not intend to codify the Second 
Circuit's case law interpretinB this pleading standard, although courts may find 
this body of law instructive. 9 
As reported by the Banking Committee, S. 240 would have added a 
new section 36 substantially similar to the text eventually enacted as 
section 21D(b): 
SEC. 36. REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS 
(a) MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS. - In any private 
action arising under this title in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant -
(I) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or 
(2) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not 
misleading; the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the plaintiff shall set forth all information on which that belief is formed. 
(b) REQUIRED STATE OF MIND. - In any private action arising under 
this title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that 
the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the plaintiff's complaint 
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this title, 
specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind.280 
According to the Senate Report, the "strong inference of scienter" 
language came from Second Circuit precedents.281 From Rule 9(b), 
279. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong. 15 (1995). 
280. S. 240, 104th Cong. (1995). In summary, the Committee report explained: 
Section I 04(b) amends the 1934 Act by adding a new Section 36, establishing 
pleading standards for Section I 0(b) actions alleging untrue statements or 
omissions of a material fact. The complaint must specifically identify each 
misleading statement and the reason or reasons why it is misleading. In any 
private action to recover money damages, the plaintiff must, for each 
misstatement or omission, specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. 
s. REP. No. 98, at 26. 
281. S. REP. No. 98, I 04th Cong., 15 (1995). 
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and the case law interpreting it, came the GlenFed requirement that 
"[t]he plaintiff ... specifically identify each statement alleged to have 
been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, 
and, if the allegation is made on information and belief, the plaintiff 
must set forth all information in plaintiff's possession on which the 
belief is formed."282 
The clear adoption of Second Circuit pleading standards pleased the 
SEC and the White House. On June 21, 1995, the SEC informed the 
0MB that "[t]he Commission supports, or does not oppose, the measures 
set forth in Section 104, 'Requirements for Securities Fraud Ac-
tions. "'283 The Executive Office of the President, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, on June 23, 1995, issued a Statement of Administra-
tion Policy announcing that "S. 240 is now a substantial improvement 
on H.R. 1058, which the Administration could not support."284 It 
noted that S.240 "adopts several sensible provisions, including a 
workable pleading standard taken from the Second Circuit."285 
Although the SEC and administration urged other modifications to the 
bill,286 adoption of the Second Circuit pleading standard met with 
· approval from the executive branch. 
d. Senator Arlen Specters Proposed Amendment 
Section 240 was debated by the Senate and amended in June, 
1995.287 Although all agreed that S. 240's text drew the "strong 
inference" standard from the Second Circuit case law, Senator Arlen 
Specter proposed an amendment intended to further clarify the phrase by 
282. Id. 
283. SEC Response to 0MB Request for Views of the Securities And Exchange 
Commission Regarding S.240, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" I 
(June 21, 1995) (copy on file with authors). 
284. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 
Statement of Administration Policy on S.240--Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 1 (June 23, 1995). 
285. Id. 
286. See SEC Response to 0MB Request for Views of the Securities And Exchange 
Commission Regarding S.240, "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" 3-5 
(June 21, 1995) (copy on file with authors); Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy on S.240--Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 1-2 (June 23, 1995) (urging modifications to 
"safe harbor" and proportionate liability provisions, and addition of provisions extending 
the limitations period for private actions and restoring liability for aiding and abetting 
securities violations). 
287. 141 CONG. REC. S8885-S8924, S8935-S8943 (daily ed. June 22, 1995); 141 
CONG. REc. S8966-S8990 (daily ed. June 23, 1995), 141 CONG. REC. S9032-9087, 
S9089-9097 (daily ed. June 26, 1995), 141 CONG. REc. S9109-9!85 (daily ed. June 27, 
1995); 141 CONG. REC. S9199-S9226, S9318-9322 (daily ed. June 28, 1995). 
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restating other language from Second Circuit case law in the text of the 
statute.288 Specifically, Senator Specter proposed adding the following 
language to expressly define how a "strong inference" of scienter might 
be raised: 
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind 
may be established either -
{A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive and 
opportunity to commit fraud; or 
(B) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of 
conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant. 289 
Senator Specter explained that by adding the "strong inference" 
phrase, "what the draftsmen have done is gone to the Court of Appeals 
for the [S]econd [C]ircuit, and they have drafted a type of pleading 
requirement which was articulated by the chief judge of the court of 
appeals by the name of John Newman."290 Senator Specter told his 
colleagues that the Second Circuit standard is "the toughest standard 
around and that is fine."291 He said the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals established guidelines for what would give rise to an inference 
of scienter so that plaintiffs would not have to guess what the standard 
meant.292 In Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co.,293 Judge 
Newman's opinion for the court held: 
A common method for establishing a strong inference of scienter is to allege 
facts showing a motive for committing fraud and a clear opportunity for doing 
so. Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by 
identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, 
though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly 
greater. 294 
Senator Specter explained that the purpose of his amendment was to 
incorporate the terminology Judge Newman used in Beck when he 
"posed this very tough standard [for] pleading."295 However, Senator 
288. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 {daily ed. June 27, 1995). 
289. Id. 
290. 141 CONG. REC. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. I 987). 
294. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting Beck v. Manufacturers 
Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
295. Id. (statement of Sen. Specter). Senator Specter further commented: "What 1 
am trying to do in this amendment is simply complete the picture and have in the statute 
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Specter's amendment failed to indicate that less particularity was 
required when plaintiffs could allege motive and opportunity. Because 
the Senate Banking Committee's report stated that the committee had 
chosen "a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the 
(S]econd [C]ircuit," Senator Specter was puzzled by the committee's 
further assertion that it did not "intend to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's 
case law interpreting this pleading standard."296 His proposed amend-
ment would "complete the picture ... so that people know what they are 
to do on the pleading."297 
Senator Bennett, who served on the Senate Banking Committee when 
it adopted the "strong inference" language298-and who would later 
serve as a Manager of the Conference Committee299 ---responded that 
the Committee did want to codify the Second Circuit standard, but that 
it "intentionally did not provide language to give guidance on exactly 
what evidence would be sufficient to prove facts giving rise to a strong 
inference of fraud. "300 He explained: 
[The committee] felt that with the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard being written 
into the bill, it was best to stop at that point and allow the courts then the 
latitude that would come beyond that point. 301 
The next day, on June 28, 1995, Senator Specter again urged 
amendment of the pleading provision, explaining that the amendment 
accepts "the very stringent standard of the (S]econd [C]ircuit on pleading 
to show state of mind, and then it adds to the legislation the way the 
[S]econd [C]ircuit says you can allege the necessary state of mind."302 
Senator D' Amato, who had chaired the Senate Banking Committee and 
submitted its report on the "strong inference" language303-and who 
would later serve as a Manager of the Conference Commit-
tee304-argued that Senator Specter's amendment, would "place too 
great a burden on plaintiffs" by limiting the ways in which scienter 
could be demonstrated: 
this standard so that people know what they are to do on the pleading." Id. 
296. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., 
I st Sess. ( 1995) ). 
297. Id. at S9171 (statement of Sen. Specter). Specifically, Senator Specter stated: 
"[I]t is one thing for the committee to say that they are not adopting a new and untested 
pleading standard, but it is only halfway if it dues not put into the statute but leaves 
open the question of how you meet this standard." Id. 
298. See S. Rep. No. I 04-98, at II. 
299. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 at 13699. 
300. 141 CONG. REC. S9172 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett). 
301. Id. 
302. 141 CONG. REC. S9200 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
303. S. Rep. No. 104-98 at II. 
304. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 at 13699. 
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S. 240 codifies the [S]econd [C]ircuit pleading standard, but this amendment 
goes further, to say precisely what evidence a party may present to show a 
strong inference of fraudulent intent. I think this straitjackets the court. 
Having said that, I could accept referring to the court['Js interpretation, but 
I think we are going too far if we adopt the language that the court referred to 
because it would tie the court[']s hand by forcing it to ask that plaintiffs prove 
exactly the delineated facts; alleging facts to show the defendant had both the 
motive and opportunity to commit fraud and by alleging facts that constitute 
strong circumstantial evidence. 
To be quite candid with you, / think it places too great a burden on the 
plaintiffs . . . . We tried to be balanced in setting this standard(;] that is why 
we did not straitjacket the court with the language in this amendment. 3°' 
Nonetheless, Senator Specter's amendment passed by a vote of 57 to 
42306 and became a part of S. 240 as it passed the Senate by a vote of 
70 to 29 on June 28, 1995.307 
e. The Conference Report Statement of the Managers 
Adopts the Second Circuit Standard 
The legislation's proponents worked on draft conference reports, to 
reconcile the House and Senate legislation, in the fall of 1995. Draft 
conference reports began appearing as early as October 23, 1995.308 
The language of Senator Specter's amendment already had been 
dropped.309 Moreover, the provision from the House bill, expressly 
adopting the Sundstrand standard for recklessness, was not included,31° 
undoubtedly because the federal decisions universally applied the 
standard already. 
On October 24, 1995, the House formally appointed its conferees.311 
A draft conference report dated November 9, 1995 altered the language 
of the pleading requirements slightly. The requirement that a plaintiff 
305. 141 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato) 
( emphasis added). 
306. 141 CONG. REC. S9201 (daily ed. June 28, 1995). 
307. 141 CONG. REC. S9219, S9222 (daily ed. June 28, 1995). 
308. Draft Conference Report, October 23, 1995 (on file with the authors). 
309. Id. at 31-32. The October draft proposed a new Exchange Act section 36. To 
see the text of of the proposal, see supra text accompanying note 281. 
310. See id. 
31 l. 141 CONG. REC. H\0690 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (appointing as conferees 
from the Committee on Commerce, Representatives Bliley, Tauzin, Fields of Texas, Cox 
of California, White, Dingell, Markey, Bryant of Texas, and Eshoo, and from the 
Committee on the Judiciary Representatives Hyde, McCollum and Conyers). 
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alleging fraud on information and belief "shall set forth all information 
on which that belief is formed,"312 became "shall state with particular-
ity all information on which that belief is formed."m The requirement 
that plaintiff "specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,"314 became 
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind."315 This was done in 
order to better conform the statutory text to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b ), in response to a letter from Judge Anthony Sirica of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit writing on behalf 
of the Judicial Council of the United States.316 
On November 15, 1995, the SEC endorsed the November 9 draft in 
a letter from Chairman Arthur Levitt and Commissioner Steven M. 
Wallman to Senator D'Amato: "While the Commission has raised a 
number of concerns about earlier versions of this legislation, we believe 
the draft conference report dated November 9th responds to our principal 
concems."317 In the SEC's view, this was not a statutory text that 
could be construed to abolish liability for recklessness, or to raise the 
standard for pleading scienter above that of the Second Circuit prece-
dents. 
Two days later, on November 17, 1996, the Senate conferees were 
formally appointed.318 That day a third "Proposed Conference Report" 
was released,319 providing that the modified provision on pleading 
standards would be codified as Exchange Act Section 21D(b).320 The 
3 I 2. See Draft Conference Report, October 23, I 995 at 3 I. 
313. Draft Conference Report, November 9, 1995, at 28. 
314. Draft Conference Report, October 23, 1995, at 31. 
3 I 5. Draft Conference Report, November 9, 1995, at 28. 
3 I 6. See 141 CONG. REc. S 19044-45 (remarks of Sen. Domenici and letter of 
October 31, 1995 from Hon. Anthony Sirica to Ms. Laura Unger and Mr. Robert Giuffra 
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). A notation to the 
November 9 draft says the changes were made to "[ c ]on form language to make the 
provision consistent with Rule 1 1." November 9 "Draft Conference Report" at 2. 
However, the language actually parallels Rule 9(b)'s requirement that circumstances 
constituting fraud be set forth "with particularity," FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b), and later floor 
debate makes clear that the effort was to conform the language to Rule 9(b ), in 
accordance with Judge Sirica's recommendation. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. Sl9044-45 
(remarks of Sen. Domenici). 
317. Letter from Chairman Arthur Levitt and Commissioner Steven M. H. Wallman, 
to Senator Alfonse D'Amato, I (Nov. 15, 1995) (on file with authors). 
318. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7361 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995) (appointing Senators 
D'Amato, Gramm, Bennett, Grams, Domenici, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry and Bryan as 
conferees on the part of the Senate). 
319. Proposed Conference Report, November 17, 1995. 
320. See id. at 27-28. 
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final Conference Report, and accompanying Statement of the Managers, 
were submitted November 28, 1995.321 
With respect to pleading standards, the Conference Committee adopted 
the Senate Banking Committee's text, codifying certain aspects of the 
Rule 9(b) jurisprudence and adopting the Second Circuit's "strong 
inference" standard. The Statement of the Managers explained that 
"[t]he Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading 
standard of the Second Circuit," and "is specifically written to conform 
the language to Rule 9(b )'s notion of pleading with 'particularity. "'322 
The Managers added that "[b ]ecause the Conference Committee intends 
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify 
the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading standard,"323 
and endnote twenty-three states that "the Conference Report chose not 
to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, 
opportunity, or recklessness,"324 which had been proposed for inclusion 
by Senator Arlen Specter. 325 
Because the "safe harbor" provision requires actual knowledge for 
some forward-looking statements, section 21D(b)(4) could not simply 
codify the Second Circuit case law or "include in the pleading standard 
certain langua§e [from the cases] relating to motive, opportunity, or 
recklessness. "3 6 For section 21 D(b )( 4) to codify a "strong inference 
of recklessness" pleading standard from Second Circuit case law would 
have conflicted with section 21E(c)(l)(B)'s increased requirement of 
"actual knowledge" for certain forward-looking statements. Neither 
could section 21D(b)(2) codify all of the Second Circuit "motive and 
opportunity" case law as a single pleading standard for all section IO(b) 
cases. Sometimes motive and opportunity raise an inference only of 
recklessness----as where an accountant or corporate officer has reason to 
recklessly turn a blind eye to wrongdoing, in disregard of actual truth or 
321. 141 CONG. REC. Hl3692 (daily ed. Nov. 28 1995). 
322. H.R. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 
740 (Statement of Managers). The Statement adds: "Regarded as the most stringent 
pleading standard, the Second Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff state facts with 
particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give rise to a 'strong inference' of the 
defendant's fraudulent intent." Id. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 48 n.23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747. 
325. 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). 
326. H.R. REP., No. 369, at 48 n.23 reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 747 (1995) 
(Statement of the Managers). 
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falsity. Thus, if section 21D(b)(2) expressly adopted Second Circuit case 
law that permits a showing of sci enter based on "motive, opportunity, or 
recklessness," it would have undermined the "actual knowledge" 
requirement for forward-looking statements. 
Instead of adopting all of the Second Circuit decisions without regard 
to the standard of scienter that ultimately must be proved, Congress 
provided that plaintiffs need only "state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind. "327 That state of mind is "actual knowledge" for cases within 
section 2l(E)(c)(l)(B)'s safe harbor, and recklessness for all others. 
Congress did not seek to abolish motive, opportunity, and reckless-
ness as means of establishing scienter in cases where liability is not 
based exclusively on forward-looking statements, and no one believed 
the Conference Report eliminated liability for reckless conduct. The 
Statement of the Managers itself says exactly the opposite: "In applying 
the 'fair share' rule of proportionate liability to cases involving non-
knowing securities violations, the Conference Committee explicitly 
determined that the legislation should make no change to the state of 
mind requirements of existing /aw."328 The Conference Report provi-
sion on proportionate liability under the Securities Act and Exchange 
Act, the Managers explained, "provides that the standard of liability in 
any such action should be determined by the pre-existing, unamended 
provision that creates the cause of action, without regard to this 
provision, which applies solely to the allocation of damages."329 For 
section lO(b) actions, other than those based exclusively on "forward-
looking statements," this would include recklessness.330 Senator 
Moseley-Braun observed that while "the original House bill abolished 
liability for reckless conduct[,] the Senate bill did not, and the Senate 
position prevailed in conference."331 Representative Bliley, who served 
as Manager for the House on the Conference Committee, confirmed that 
with the exception of the safe-harbor and proportionate-liability 
provisions, "[t]he conference report is careful not to change standards of 
liability under the securities laws."332 
327. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (1995). 
328. H.R. REP. No. 369, at 38, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 737. (1995) (Statement 
of the Managers) (emphasis added). 
329. Id. ( emphasis added). 
330. See supra notes 133- I 36 and accompanying text. 
331. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7984 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moseley-
Braun). 
332. 141 CONG. REc., Hl4040 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bliley) 
( emphasis added). 
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While some of the legislation's opponents were troubled by the 
Statement of the Managers----fearing that it might be misinterpreted as 
calling for a more-demanding pleading standard than the Second Circuit 
precedents----the Conference Committee Managers themselves uniformly 
understood the Conference Report to adopt its pleading standard from 
the Second Circuit case law. Senator Dodd explained that the Commit-
tee Mana~ers had "adopt[ed] the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
standard." 33 The Conference Report therefore contrasted with the 
earlier House Bill, which had "established pleading standards that were 
so high ... that it would have been impossible to bring a suit ... had 
the [earlier] House language been adopted."334 "This legislation, 
therefore, is using a pleadings standard that has been successfully tested 
. . . in the real world. "335 
Senator Domenici similarly explained that "the conference report 
adopts the pleading standard utilized by the [S]econd [C]ircuit [C]ourt 
of [A]ppeals, where a large number of securities fraud lawsuits are 
brought."336 Among its advantages was the body of precedent apply-
ing the "strong-inference" standard: "This court-tested standard requires 
plaintiffs to plead facts in their complaint which give rise to a strong 
inference of securities fraud."337 Senators Dodd and Domenici had 
authored this, "the Dodd-Domenici bill," they had shepherded it through 
Congress, and then served as Managers for the Senate on the Conference 
Committee. Other members of the Conference Committee agreed with 
them that the statute codified a pleading standard from the Second 
Circuit case law, even if it did not specifically codify particular decisions.338 
333. 141 CONG. REC. SI7959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
334. 141 CONG. REC. SI7959 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 
see also 141 CONG. REC. S 17957 (Dec. 5, 1995) ("The conference report clarifies current 
requirements that lawyers should have some facts . . . to back up their assertion of 
security fraud by adopting most of the reasonable standards established by the U.S. 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.") (statement of Sen. Dodd); 141 CONG. REc. S17959 
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (the conferees intended to "adopt the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals standard") (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
335. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7957 (daily ed. Dec. S, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
336. 141 CONG. REC. S\7969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici). 
337. 141 CONG. REC. S\7969 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici). 
338. Senator Grams, who served with Dodd and Domenici on the Conference 
Committee as a Manager for the Senate, confirmed that the legislation provided for 
"[c]odification of the pleading standard adopted by the [S]econd [C]ircuit [C]ourt of 
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When Senator Specter asked if the Conference Report repudiated 
Second Circuit case law, Senator Dodd told him that it did not: "Basic-
ally, what we intended to do here was to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's 
pleadings standards, not to indicate disapproval of each individual case 
that came before it."339 He added that courts would be free to follow 
the Second Circuit case law, explaining that, although "the committee 
does not intend . . . to codify the [S]econd [C]ircuit's case law 
interpreting this pleading standard, ... courts may find this body [ of] 
law instructive."340 Senator Dodd elaborated, explaining: 
[I]nstead of trying to take each case that came under the [S]econd [C]ircuit, we 
are trying to get to the point where we would have well-pleaded complaints. 
We are using the standards in the [S]econd [C]ircuit in that regard, then letting 
the courts---as these matters wilHest. They can then refer to specific cases, 
the [S]econd [C]ircuit, [or] otherwise, to determine if these standards are [met] 
based on facts and circumstances in a particular case. That is what we are 
trying to do here. 341 
Other legislators took the Managers at their word. Senator Moseley-
Braun concluded that although "[i]n the area of pleading, the House bill 
[had] adopted a standard that was significantly higher than the [S]econd 
[C]ircuit standard, which was the standard adopted in the Senate bill," 
it was "[t]he Senate position [that] prevailed at conference."342 Both 
Senator Hatch and Senator Dole agreed that "the legislation adopts the 
Second Circuit pleading standard."343 Only the bill's opponents 
doubted that. 
f President Clinton s Veto and the Veto-Override Debate 
The Statement of the Managers was not as clear as its authors might 
have hoped. President Clinton "took the unusual step of citing 
[A]ppeals." 141 CONG. REC. 17993 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Grams). 
Another Conference Committee Manager, Senator D' Amato, explained that the 
Conference Report "creates a uniform standard for complaints that alleged securities 
fraud," and that "[t]his standard is already the law in New York," which is in the Second 
Circuit. 141 CONG. REc. SI7934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. D'Amato). 
"It requires a plaintiff to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of the defendant's 
fraudulent intent." CONG. REC. Sl7934 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
D'Amato). 
339. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
340. Id. 
341. Id. 
342. 141 CONG. REC. Sl7984 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995)(statement of Sen. Moseley-
Braun). 
343. 141 CONG. REC. S17966, Sl7983 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statements of Sen. 
Hatch and Sen. Dole). 
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nonbinding report language as a reason for his veto" of the bill,344 
fearing that the Statement of the Managers might be construed to impose 
a more demanding standard for pleading scienter than that adopted by 
the Second Circuit case law.345 However, contrary to Silicon Graph-
ics, nothing he said suggested he believed either the bill's text or the 
Statement of the Managers abolished liability for reckless miscon-
duct.346 
Moreover, the veto-override debate confirms that the bill's proponents 
did not intend to do away with the Second Circuit standard---they 
intended to adopt it. Representative Lofgren, for example, explained: 
"The President says he supports the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard for 
pleading. So do I. That is what is included in this bill."347 Senator 
Domenici stated: "The President objected to the pleading standard. Yet 
it is the Second Circuit's pleading standard."348 Whatever it meant, far 
344. House, Senate Quickly Override Veto of Bill Limiting Lawsuits, 53 CONG. Q. 
3879, 3880 (1995). 
345. In his December I 9, I 995, veto message, President Clinton explained: 
I believe that the pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard 
to a defendant's state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to 
meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts. I am prepared to support the 
high pleading standard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit-the highest pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the 
conferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their intent to raise 
the standard even beyond that level. I am not prepared to accept that. 
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and 
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case law 
with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically indicated that 
they were not adopting Second Circuit case law but instead intended to 
"strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second Circuit. All this 
shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier to bringing suit than 
any now existing--one so high that even the most aggrieved investors with the 
most painful losses may get tossed out of court before they have a chance to 
prove their case. 
Veto Message of President William J. Clinton (Dec. I 9, I 995). 
346. See id. 
347. 141 CONG. REC. Hl5219 (daily ed. Dec. 20 1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren). 
348. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9150 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici); see also 141 CONG. REC. Sl9066 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of 
Sen. Dodd). Senator Domenici placed in the Congressional Record a document 
summarizing his understanding of the Conference Committee Report's provisions: 
Second [C]ircuit pleading standard becomes the uniform rule. - Same as 
Senate-passed bill; Senator Specter's amendment deleted from conference 
report. 
The objective: . . . To codify the requirements in the 2nd Circuit. 
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from controlling interpretation of section 21D(b)(2), language in the 
Statement of Managers should not affect the statute's meaning: "We 
know we are going to have the Second Circuit standard applied, and that 
in fact when legislation is at variance with legislative history or report 
language, that it is the bill itself that prevails."349 Representative 
Deutsch, as a member of the Conference Committee, rose to declare that 
"[r]eport language has no effect on the bill."350 Senator Domenici 
agreed: "A statement of the managers is not law, everyone knows 
that."351 The bill's proponents were mystified that the President would 
veto a bill on the basis of a legislative history that could not contradict 
its clear terms: 
Now, the Constitution gives the President the authority to veto legislation, but 
nowhere does it give the President authority to veto legislative history. I think 
a veto on the grounds of legislative histo7 in this case is extreme, especially 
in light of the clear language of the bill." 
Senator Bradley, in particular, rejected contentions that the Confer-
ence Committee Report might impose a higher pleading standard than 
the Second Circuit precedents: 
Now much has been made of the exact specifications surrounding the pleading 
standard in the bill. A number of critics contend that it goes beyond the 
already stringent standards of the {Sjecond [C}ircuit--and would have the 
effect of closing the courthouse door for many small plaintiffs. Ambiguities in 
the statement of managers have served only to heighten these criticisms. In 
fact. the language of the bill does codify the [S}econd [C}ircuit standard in 
part-and the statement of managers says so. 
But even within the [S]econd [C]ircuit, there are varying interpretations of 
the standard. That is why the conference report deliberately rejects a complete 
codification of the [S]econd [C]ircuit and adopts language which is substantially 
similar to the language of the Senate-passed bill and its report language. 353 
Senator Dodd complained that the Specter amendment, by allowing 
recklessness to raise a strong inference of scienter in all cases, would 
undermine the requirement of actual knowledge for some claims: "[T]he 
A complaint should outline the facts supporting the lawsuit. ... Under the 
Conference Agreement, the complaint must set forth the facts supporting each 
of the alleged misstatements or omissions and must include facts that give rise 
to a "strong inference" of scienter or intent. ... This is a codification of the 
2nd Circuit rule. 
141 CONG. REC. Sl9151 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995). 
349. 141 CONG. REC. H15218 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moran). 
350. 141 CONG. REC. H15220 (daily ed.Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Deutsch). 
351. 141 CONG. REC. S19045 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Domenici). 
352. 141 CONG. REC. S19054 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
353. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9149 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) 
( emphasis added). 
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Specter amendment . . . was an effort to get recklessness in" section 
21D(b) as a pleading standard for all section lO(b) claims, "which 
would have changed the standard from the [S]econd [C]ircuit"354 as 
formulated in the Senate Report. But Senator Dodd did not believe the 
Conference Report changed the Second Circuit standards for raising an 
inference of scienter from allegations of motive and opportunity or 
recklessness. Far from it. 
According to the bill's leading proponent, "motive" would provide 
the necessary "strong inference" of scienter.355 In debate on the veto 
override, Senator Dodd quoted Stanford University Professor Joseph 
Grundfest----a former SEC commissioner----as "one of the most knowl-
edgeable people in this particular area," for his opinion that under "the 
securities litigation conference report, the pleading standard is faithful to 
the Second Circuit's test."356 Dodd and Grundfest assured Congress 
that this "'pleading standard articulated by the Second Circuit of Appeals 
is intended simply to require the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to give 
rise to a strong inference of motive to defraud. "'357 Senator Dodd 
explained: "We have clearly established the standard of alleging facts 
with particularity, showing a strong inference of motive."358 
Dodd condemned Senator Specter's amendment, which had sought to 
insert specific language about motive, opportunity, and recklessness,359 
not for incorporating the guidance of Second Circui~recedents on these 
points, but for deviating from those precedents.3 He and Senator 
Reid both quoted Professor Grundfest's conclusion that "the Specter 
amendment language . . . was an incomplete and inaccurate codification 
of case law in the circuit."361 Senator Dodd explained: 
354. 141 CONG. REC. SI9071 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
355. 141 CONG REC. SI9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
356. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd, 
quoting letter of Professor Joseph Grundfest). 
357. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd, 
quoting letter of Joseph Grundfest). 
358. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) 
( emphasis added). 
359. See 141 CONG. REC. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). 
360. See 141 CONG. REC. S9170-71 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) ("The Specter 
amendment said he was codifying the guidance in the [S]econd [C]ircuit and that is not 
the case."). Dodd had earlier argued that Senator Specter's amendment was an 
incomplete statement of Second Circuit law. See infra note 364 and accompanying text. 
361. 141 CONG. REC. SI9067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 
see also 141 CONG. REC. Sl9084 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Reid, 
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Where motive is apparent, you do not have to make any a/legations of a lot of 
circumstances. If you have a clear motive, you do not have to worry about the 
circumstances or the alleged strong facts. Where you do not have motive, 
apparently, and that can be a case where it is hard to get at that motive, then 
you are going to allege circumstances. There Judge Newman says, "Where 
motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by identifying 
circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, though the 
strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater." 
Greater. The Specter amendment does not distinguish at all between [when 
motive is and is not apparent] ... [He} therefore did not really follow the 
guidance o[, the [S]econd [C}ircuit. So that is the reason that amendment was 
taken out. 3 2 
Dodd explained that, far from foreclosing reliance on Second Circuit 
precedent, the Conference Committee actually expected courts to look 
to that court's decisions for guidance: 
You could have gone in, I suppose, and said why did you not include the other 
language [from the Second Circuit precedents] here? The problem was, in a 
sense, by codifying [judicial] guidance you get into an area where you can get 
some differences of opinion on this. And arguably it could have, I suppose, 
gone back and included all of it, but the decision was to take it out on the 
assumption that the courts will look to the guidance. 363 
Dodd believed that the Second Circuit's guidance would be followed 
because the standard was established in the statute.364 He explained: 
We have met the [S]econd [C]ircuit standard here, as indicated by the 
memorandum from Judge Grundfest .... We have met that standard. We have 
left out the guidance. That does not mean you disregard it. 36' 
Indeed, Senator Dodd observed that "the suggestion that somehow the 
courts are going to disregard the guidance because it is no longer in the 
bill itself, it has not been codified, I think overstates the case. "366 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Exchange Act section 21D(b) combines the Ninth Circuit's standard 
for pleading falsity and the Second Circuit's standard for pleading 
scienter into a single national standard for pleading securities fraud under 
the Exchange Act. By requiring plaintiffs to raise "a strong inference of 
the required state of mind," Congress did not intend to increase the 
quoting Professor Grundfest). 
362. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co., 820 F.2d at 50) 
( emphasis added). 
363. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
364. 141 CONG. REC. S 19068 ( daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995). 
365. 141 CONG. REc. Sl9068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
366. 141 CONG. REC. Sl9071 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
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required state of mind or to cast doubt on the continued validity of 
Second Circuit precedents holding that plaintiffs may raise a strong 
inference of scienter with allegations of motive and opportunity or by 
pleading facts suggesting conscious wrongdoing or reckless disregard. 
Congress considered doing away with liability for reckless misconduct, 
but chose only to limit liability for reckless violations and to require 
knowing conduct only for certain forward-looking statements. 
The Statement of the Managers does not support a contrary conclu-
sion. Although President Clinton believed the Statement of the 
Managers indicated that the Conference Committee intended to impose 
a pleading standard more demanding than the Second Circuit's, the 
legislative history conclusively demonstrates that the bill's proponents 
did not intend this. The veto-override debate shows that Congress 
intended, in fact, to enact the Second Circuit standard, and the bill's 
leading proponents specifically endorsed motive and opportunity as 
means of establishing scienter. 
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